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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
v.
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS,
:

Case No. 2003 0817-CA

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this direct
appeal from class A misdemeanor convictions entered in a court of record.
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
1. Is the communications fraud statute unconstitutional?
This issue poses a question of law, to be reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Wood
v. University of Utah Medical Center. 2002 UT 134, ^ 7, 67 P.3d 436.
This issue was preserved in the trial court by motion, memoranda and argument, and
by the entry of conditional pleas expressly preserving Mr. Norris' right to appeal this issue
(R. 37-80, 113, 1822).
2. Did the trial court lack jurisdiction?
This issue poses a question of law, to be reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Security
Inv. Ltd. v. Brown, 2002 UT App. 131,f 8,47P.3d97, cert, denied, 53 P.3d 1 (Utah 2002).

This issue was preserved in the trial court by motion, memoranda and argument, and
by the entry of conditional pleas preserving Mr. Norris' right to appeal this issue (R. 109-117,
159-163, 283-86, 1822).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are copied in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
On September 8, 2003, Norris entered conditional no contest pleas to two counts of
attempted communications fraud, expressly preserving his right to appeal the constitutionality
of the charging statute, and the court's jurisdiction (R. 1814-1822).
Because Norris had already served the maximum time, Judge Reese closed the case,
and granted Norris credit for time served (R. 1823).
Trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 1829).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because there was no trial, the key facts are procedural, and pertain to the claims that
the lower court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Norris' case and that the
communications fraud statute is unconstitutional.
West Valley City originally chose to bring the prosecution after the Salt Lake County
Attorney's office declined to prosecute it after the prosecutors determined the case was a
civil contractual dispute (R. 1861 at 4-5).

2

West Valley City charged Norris in the name of the State of Utah in case number
941004929, with four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud allegedly occurring on
May 12, 1994, and the bail was set at $2000 (R. 165, 621-22).1
After Norris challenged the West Valley City information because it alleged no
victims, values, or specific facts regarding the charges, West Valley filed an amended
information on October 2, 1995, charging four class A misdemeanor counts of
communications fraud against four different victims on or about March, April and/or May
of 1993, alleging a value of more than $300 in each count (R. 646-47).
Norris moved to dismiss the amended West Valley City information on statute of
limitations grounds and because the original information failed to state an offense and thus
failed to establish jurisdiction.
While reviewing the matter, Circuit Judge Watson dismissed the case because he
determined that he had no jurisdiction because the case should have been filed as a felony
case, based on the fact that the money involved in one victim's case exceeded the $1,000
jurisdictional amount for the circuit court, and because the aggregate amounts in the case
involving four victims and $300 in each count required district court jurisdiction (R. 32, 3637, 290, 624-27, 682-684, 698).

[

The various informations filed against Norris as a result of the same criminal
episode are copied in the addendum to this brief
Counsel for Norris has designated as part of the record on appeal all of the
pleadings files from the related cases. For clarity, however, in this brief, counsel cites
only to the pleadings files in the last case filed, district court case number 971008355.
3

The West Valley City Attorney appealed the dismissal to this Court in case number
960151-CA(R. 165,700-702).
While the West Valley City appeal was pending, on September 30, 1996, the County
Attorney's Office, acting in the name of the state of Utah, charged Norris in case number
961020866 with eleven counts of third degree felony communications fraud occurring in
May of 1993, based on the same facts as the original West Valley case, but without naming
any victims (R. 49-53, 128, 165, 176-180). The information listed bail in the amount of
$75,000 (R. 49).
On December 10,1996, Judge Palmer quashed the charges in case number 961020866
because the West Valley City appeal was still pending (R. 166). He indicated that he would
not hear the case until the West Valley case was completely disposed of (R. 131).
That same day, West Valley moved this Court to dismiss its appeal, because the State
would prosecute the same conduct at issue in the West Valley case, in new felony charges,
but could not do so until the appeal was dismissed (R. 742).
On January 21, 1997, Judge Hilder ordered all records in case number 961020866
expunged (R. 281).
This Court dismissed the West Valley appeal on March 26, 1997 (R. 785).
On April 2, 1997, the State refiled ten third degree felony charges against Norris in
case number 971005698 (R. 55-60, 166, 182-87). In this information, each count named a
separate specific victim (R. 55-58).
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The probable cause statement indicated that the case was based on police report
number 94-253 76 (R. 59), the same police report underlying case number 961020866 (R. 53),
which report should have been expunged pursuant to Judge Hilder's expungement order (R.
281).
The prosecutor later conceded that the ten victims were all involved in the same
criminal scheme as was underlying the original West Valley informations, although seven
of the victims were not alleged in the amended West Valley charges (R. 1860 at5-10, 12-13,
20).
The information listed $75,000 in bail (R. 55).
The information indicated that there had been no prior related cases (R. 60), despite
the fact that there had been two prior cases.
On April 11, 1997, Judge Dever dismissed case number 971005698 as well, ruling
that the State could not refile until the remittitur in the West Valley City case issued (R. 34,
166; R. 1860 at 27).
This Court issued the remittitur on May 13, 1997 (R. 208).
Norris moved to recall the remittitur, because this Court issued it prematurely (R. 41).
On May 15, 1997, the State again refiled, alleging twenty third degree felony counts
in case number 971008355 (R. 12-21, 62-70, 189-199). Each of the twenty counts in the
information made the same allegation, although there were two counts for each of the ten
victims named in the prior case (R. 2-9).

5

These were the same victims that the prosecutor conceded were all involved in the
same criminal scheme as was underlying the original West Valley informations (R. 1860 at
5-10, 12-13,20).
This filing was again based (R. 9) on the same police report (R. 53), which should
have been expunged pursuant to Judge Hilder's order (R. 281).
At the time that 971008355 was filed, the West Valley case was on appeal, and case
number 971005698 was set for a hearing before Judge Dever, because there was a pending
motion to dismiss with prejudice (R. 1861 at 7-8, 16).
However, the portion of the information which is supposed to reflect "prior related
cases" in the last information filed again indicated that there were "none." (R. 11).
Like the number of charges, the amount of bail in the last refiling doubled, to
$150,000 (R. 62).
Judge Reese permitted the prosecutors to file this information, but informed them that
they could not proceed on it until the remittitur arrived in the West Valley appeal (R. 156).
On May 22, 1997, Judge Reese denied a motion to dismiss this case after indicating
that the case was not yet his, but that he had agreed to hear Norris' motion to dismiss it,
before there was an initial appearance on the case (R. 1861 at 2, 32). Judge Reese ruled that
if Judge Dever ruled that case number 971005698 was dismissed without prejudice, the new
case, 971008355, should be assigned to Judge Dever under State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644
(Utah 1986) (R. 1861 at 30-31).

6

On June 30, 1997, this Court recalled the remittitur, upon the Utah Supreme Court's
order dated June 26, 1997 (R 211)
On October 29, 1997, this Court stayed the issuance of the remittitur pending
disposition of Norns's petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court (R
214)
On November 19, 1997, Judge Dever refused to rule on a motion to dismiss with
prejudice, and stayed the proceedings pending completion of the appellate proceedings,
because until the remittitur issued from the appellate court, he could not act in the trial court
(R 166, R 1864 at 4)
This Court issued the remittitur on October 30, 1998, upon the denial of Norris'
petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court (R 124-125)
At a hearing on December 4, 1998, Judge Dever rejected the argument that the case
should be viewed as having been filed after the remittitur issued, ruled that the case was filed
in May of 1997, and that there was nothing to prohibit the prosecutors from refiling before
the remittitur issued (R 777, 779) Judge Dever also rejected the argument that he should
dismiss the case with prejudice as a result of Judge Hilder's order expunging the underlying
records (R 773)
Judge Dever also demed the challenge to the constitutionality of the communications
fraud statute, ruling that the statute required separate charges for each communication, to be
classified individually on the basis of the aggregated values of all communications m the
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scheme (R. 773-776).
At the preliminary hearing on February 26, 1999, the State moved to dismiss eight of
the counts because some of the witnesses were not present (R. 146; R. 1866 at 176-77).
The prosecution called eight witnesses in support of the twelve remaining counts.2

2

The State's theory of its case at the preliminary hearing was unclear. In some
instances it seemed to be that Norris was associated with a business named Laroe
International, which hired the alleged victims under pretenses, promulgated in newspaper
advertisements and sometimes by Norris personally, that their job descriptions were
markedly different than the job descriptions contained in various written agreements
which the alleged victims signed. Norris later sued the alleged victims for breaching the
written agreements. See, e.g.. State's Exhibits 2, 3, 6, Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 3
(examples of the agreements); R. 1866 at 8-19 (testimony of Joan Mattson).
In other instances, however, the State's theory seemed to be that Norris failed to
fulfill the terms of the written agreements or oral understandings regarding the alleged
victims' terms of employment. See, e.g., R. 1867 at 182-208.
At the preliminary hearing, Joan Mattson testified that she saw an advertisement
on May 20, 1993, in the Ogden Standard Examiner, and attended an interview which led
her to believe that she could earn a salary and benefits selling a diet product for Laroe
International, and that she was responsible for, but not the purchaser of, the diet product
(R. 1866 at 8-11, 13-14, 32). The job in fact was not a salaried sales position, but was a
multi-level position requiring her to recruit sales people, and the Product Installment
Agreement she signed characterized her as an independent contractor who had purchased
the diet product from Laroe (R. 1866 at 13-14, 19, 32). Mattson decided not to take the
job, did not make any sales presentations and was not paid (R. 1866 at 18). She conceded
that Norris complied with the product return agreement (R. 1866 at 45). Norris later
sued her for $1,200 under the Product Installment Agreement (R. 1866 at 19).
Michael Mabry answered an advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune to be a sales
manager for a $1,400 a month salary (R. 1866 at 94-95). He met personally with Norris
and did not realize he was committing to being an independent contractor who had
purchased the diet product, and later learned that Norris would not pay the advertised
salary (R. 1866 at 100, 110). He initially testified that he worked for two weeks, but then
testified that he did nothing after the first week because he felt the company was a fraud
(R. 1866 at 99). Norris later sued him for approximately $1200 (R. 1866 at 100, 113).
Kay Lemmon saw an advertisement on April 4, 1993 for a diet counselor position
paying $1,400 salary plus benefits and met twice with Norris (R. 1866 at 115-16). She
8

believed she was responsible for the product she was to distribute, but did not understand
that she would owe Norris for the product she did not sell (R. 1866 at 126). She claimed
she was unaware that the employment agreement required her to meet a quota of one
hundred and twenty-nine sales presentations a month (R. 1866 at 132). She quit going to
work after about two weeks (R. 1866 at 133). After reading the Product Installment
Agreement, she repeatedly told Norris that she did not have any money to put down on
the diet product, but he told her not to worry, and that they would just keep an inventory
on it (R. 1866 at 117). She tried to return the product and he refused to take it, and later
sued her for $1964 (R. 1866 at 119).
Chris Atkins answered an advertisement for employment as some type of sports
counselor in late May of 1993 (R. 1866 at 138). He came to a group meeting, had an
individual interview, and then a training meeting when he received an inventory of the
product (R. 1866 at 140). He signed a product installment agreement, after Norris told
him it was a substitute for an inventory form that Norris had run out of at the time (R.
1866 at 151). Atkins knew he would have to pay the company if he sold any diet product,
but thought he could return the unsold bottles (R. 1866 at 153). When he demanded
payment of his salary, Norris informed him he would be paid by commission, not salary,
but then never paid him (R. 1866 at 146). He tried to return the product, but Norris would
not take it, and later sued him for about $2,000 (R. 1866 at 142).
Susan Hunter saw an ad in a Utah County journal for work with nutritional
supplements, paying between $800 and $1,200, depending on the number of hours
worked (R. 1866 at 158-59, 166). She went to a group meeting, and was hired to service
established accounts (R. 1866 at 160-61). She attended training meetings for two weeks,
but after leaving to attend to her family, was never able to contact Norris to begin
working (R. 1866 at 161-62). She signed a sheet regarding the product, but thought it
was just for inventory, and did not understand that she was supposed to sell the product
(R. 1866 at 163). Norris later sued her for around $2,700 (R. 1866 at 164).
Joy Slotsve answered an advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune in May of 1993
advertising a diet consultant position paying a salary of $1400 a month (R. 1867 at 182).
She met personally with Norris, and someone called her back and she was hired (R. 1867
at 184-85). She believed she would be paid the salary to sell the product (R. 1867 at 185).
She made sales presentations, but was never paid (R. 1867 at 186). She was required to
buy the product as part of her job, and when she tried to return it within the fifteen days
under the contract, Norris refused it (R. 1867 at 186-87). She believed she could return
unopened individual containers, but he would not accept open boxes of sealed individual
containers (R. 1867 at 196). She gave him a check for the portion of the product that was
used, but he refused to cash it and sued her for the full amount (R. 1867 at 188). He sued
her for $2,700, and then sued her for $30,000 for "turning people against him." (R. 1867
9

Judge Palmer bound over on the twelve counts (R. 1868 at 37).
After the evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing, trial counsel for Norris
argued, inter alia, that the information in the last case, number 971008355, should be viewed
as having been filed when the remittitur issued in October of 1998, and argued that the
statute of limitations had run (R. 1867 at 210-213). Trial counsel argued that a case could
not be pending simultaneously in two courts by virtue of due process of law (R. 1868 at 9,
14).
Judge Palmer ruled that the date of filing was May 15, 1997 (R. 1868 at 22). He

at 189, 207-08).
Kaylynn Crosby Blackham worked as a secretary to Norris, and testified that he
would not let salespeople return the product unless it was unopened and they met with
him (T. 57-60). She quit her job because she could not stop people from returning the
product, because Norris would not make appointments for them to return the product, and
because Norris yelled at her because she let them return it (R. 1866 at 64).
Karen Noland testified that she was a secretary for Norris in businesses other than
Laroe International (R. 1866 at 72-73). Norris repeatedly said that the company could not
afford to pay the $1,400, but since no one would make the sales quota in their contract,
they would not have to pay (R. 1866 at 76-77). He planned to make money off the
salespeople, who had agreed to buy the product, and could not sell their quota (R. 1866 at
78).
She testified that he was going to arrange a similar business in Pennsylvania,
because he could obtain default judgments against people by putting certain language in
the contracts (R. 1866 at 79-80). He had her put together magazines to support his claims
in a different advertising business that he had completed advertisements, when in fact he
had not (R. 1866 at 92).
She quit after Norris called her from Las Vegas and told her that there was a
warrant out for him over the Laroe cases, and he did not want to go to jail (R. 1866 at 88).
He did not want her telling the police anything about what went on in the office (R. 1866
at 89). He told her that if the police came in, she should hit two keys on the computer to
destroy records of old clients so the police could not contact them (R. 1866 at 90-91).
10

found that Norris could not benefit from his own delays, which tolled the statute of
limitations, and that he was not put in jeopardy twice (R. 1868 at 22; R. 232-233). He ruled
that the charges were timely under the statute of limitations (R. 1868 at 22; R. 232-233).
Trial counsel for Norris objected to the order (R. 235-36).
The State filed an amended information charging eleven counts, again relying on the
expunged police report (R. 218-223).
Trial counsel for Norris moved to strike all records which were ordered expunged by
Judge Hilder, noting that the State had violated Judge Hilder' s expungement order by relying
on the expunged records to charge Norris, and arguing that the State should not be permitted
to utilize the expunged records against him (R. 273-282; R. 1873 at 71).
While the prosecutor, Ernie Jones, had earlier argued at the December 4,1998 hearing
before Judge Dever that the State opted not to fight Norris' expungement petition when he
filed it because the prosecution did not believe that the expungement would prevent them
from refiling (R. 766), in the October 21, 1999 hearing before Judge Reese, the same
prosecutor then told Judge Reese that he "never never" received the expungement petition
until after the fact, and that if the prosecution had received notice that he was trying to
expunge his records, they "would have been in there objecting." (R. 1873 at 78; R. 131).
Judge Reese ruled that it was permissible for the police to rely on the original
investigative material in refiling the case after the expungement, and that the State could rely
on the evidence at the trial (R. 1873 at 80-81).
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On October 29, 1999, trial counsel for Norris moved for a bill of particulars (R. 328333).
Judge Reese denied Norris' motion to dismiss, ruling that the prosecution's charges
were timely filed, and were properly filed while the West Valley case was on appeal (R. 1873
at 69-70).
On November 17, 1999, Norris entered guilty pleas to two third degree felony counts
of communications fraud (R. 1273).
Judge Reese sentenced Norris to two consecutive terms of zero to five years on
January 3, 2000 (R. 1481-1488).
On July 27,2000, Judge Reese denied Norris' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R.
1538-39).
On September 26, 2002, this Court published an opinion reversing this ruling and
ordering the trial court to permit with withdrawal of the guilty pleas (1578-84). See, State
v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, 57 P.3d 238.
Norris moved to dismiss for vindictive prosecution (R. 1643-46).
Norris again moved for a bill of particulars, noting the history of vagueness of the
charges against Norris, and asking the government to specify the scheme or artifice to
defraud, the value, the communications, and the mens rea (R. 1649-51).
On September 8,2003, Mr. Norris pled no contest to two class A misdemeanor counts
of attempted communications fraud, reserving his right to appeal the issues of the
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constitutionality of the communications fraud statute, and district court jurisdiction (R. 18141822).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should strike the communications fraud statute because it is
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The plain terms of the statute criminalize a vast
array of constitutionally protected speech, and permit a constitutionally excessive amount of
prosecutorial discretion. The vagueness of the statute has aheady resulted in a number of
significantly different interpretations and applications of the statute in this case and in many
others.
Alternatively, this Court should order the lower court to permit the withdrawal of
Norris' pleas, and to dismiss the case, because the trial court never properly obtained subject
matter jurisdiction over Norris' case. Because the case was pending in the appellate courts
and remittitur had not issued from this Court when the prosecution refiled the information,
the filing of the information was void. Because the prosecutors abused their power to refile
the case to harass Norris, and because they vindictively increased the four misdemeanor
charges to twenty felony counts, and radically increased the bail from the original $2,000,
to $150,000, to punish Norris' asserting his rights in the appeal and Norris' pursuit of
dismissal of the refiled counts, the prosecutors violated due process of law and defeated the
trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.
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Individually, and certainly cumulatively,3 the errors undermining Norris' charges and
convictions warrant reversal.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD.4
A. THE LEGISLATURE MUST DEFINE CRIMES, PARTICULARLY WHEN
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS INVOLVED.
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees due process of law, as does the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Doctrines of procedural and
substantive due process call for legislation that is sufficiently specific to give notice of
proscribed behavior. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987); In re Bover, 636
P.2d 1085, 1087-1088 (Utah 1981).
The vagueness doctrine is designed to insure that citizens have notice of the legal
consequences of their actions, and to insure that legislative policy determinations are not
delegated to those who are to enforce and apply the laws. See, Grayned v. Rockford, 408

3

Under the cumulative error doctrine, the Court should consider all errors, both
identified and assumed by the Court to have occurred, and reverse if "'the cumulative
effect of the several errors undermines [the Court's] confidence . . . that a fair trial was
had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
4

The constitutionality and interpretation of the communications fraud statute is also
at issue in other cases presently pending before this Court - State v. Norris, Case No.
20020966-CA and State v. Bradshaw. Case No. 20020137-CA. Variants of some of the
arguments in this brief originated in the briefs in those cases, written by Jennifer Gowans
and Kent Hart, respectively.
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U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
The vagueness doctrine is particularly focused on legislative failure to define criminal
standards, because our nation values the freedom of our citizens, and seeks to prevent
executive and judicial branch actors from having excessive discretion to discriminate in the
enforcement and application of the laws. Kolender v Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983).
In addition to the general due process guarantees mentioned above, the Utah
Constitution requires the legislature to define the criminal law, vesting the lawmaking power
in the legislative branch of our state government. See Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1.
Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution mandates separation of government
powers. This constitutional provision recognizes the critical balance of the branches of our
government, which requires the legislature to write specific laws, rather than enacting vague
laws explicitly or implicitly delegating to police, prosecutors and judges the responsibility
to define the law. See State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah App.)(statute explicitly delegating
to U.S. Attorney authority to define elements and punishment of crimes under controlled
substances act violated non-delegation doctrine of Article VI section 1 of Utah Constitution),
cert, denied. 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah 1990); State v. Galliot 572 P.2d 683 (Utah
1977)(statute explicitly delegating to Utah Attorney General authority to define elements and
punishment of crimes under controlled substances act violated Article V, section 1 of the
Utah Constitution). See also State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Utah 1986)(Howe, J.,
concurring)(,f,It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough
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to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to courts to step inside and say who could be
rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute
the judicial for the legislative department of the government.M,)(citation omitted).
Courts must strictly scrutinize for vagueness criminal statutes such as the
communications fraud statute, which may impinge upon First Amendment rights, to insure
that the laws are drafted with "narrow specificity" so that such rights have adequate
"breathing space." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
B. THE LEGISLATURE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY DEFINE COMMUNICATIONS
FRAUD.
The communications fraud statute, § 76-10-1801, currently provides,
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is
less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property,
money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds
$1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is or
exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme
or artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of something of
monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1)
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shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained
or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the
offense described in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing
of value is not a necessary element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and
offense of communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow,
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk
over; or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited
to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television,
newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted
were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for
the truth.
The 1990 version of the statute which should have applied to Norris' 1993 offenses
was the same as the current version, but differed on the classification values.5

5

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990) differed only in subsection (1), which then
provided,
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material
omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by
any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice
is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but -does not exceed $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
17

The term "artifice" is not defined by law, but is commonly defined as "false or
insincere behavior" or a "trick," - terms that can be used to describe any form of dishonesty.
See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (19831 at page 106.
The word "communicate" is also given the broadest possible definition under the
statute, and subsection (1) of the statute purports to penalize communication "with any
person," without regard to whether one widely published utterance by a defendant might
reach multiple persons and arguably sustain multiple charges, regardless of whether anyone
relied on the utterance.
The phrase "anything of value" is not defined and its application is therefore left to
the eye of the beholder for definition.
The plain language of the statute provides that it is a crime to devise a scheme or
artifice to defraud or to obtain anything of value by means of false pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions, and to communicate directly or indirectly with any person
by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice. Because of

obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed
$10,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed
$100,000;
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more.
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this disjunctive language, there need be no intent to defraud; a desire to obtain something of
value satisfies the statute.6
The following discussion demonstrates that the language of the communications fraud
statute gives rise to multiple interpretations and applications, in violation of the vagueness
doctrine, discussed above. The differing interpretations give rise to various additional
constitution problems, discussed below.
1. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND CONSTITUTIONAL OVERBREADTH
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to
freedom of speech and the press.
Article I § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides,
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest
against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely
their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.

Consistent with standard English language usage, Utah courts recognize that when
statutes or rules are phrased in the disjunctive, this requires the selection of only one of
the provisions selection of only one of the provisions joined by the word "or." See, e.g.,
State v. Walker, 649 P. 2d 16, 17 (Utah 1982)(in finding that incorrect jury instruction was
actually to the defendant's benefit, the court recognized that the statute at issue, § 76-6404 "requires finding only one of two disjunctives"); In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 215
(Utah 1997)(rule governing disbarment is phrased in the disjunctive, and thus requires
only one of several findings listed); Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company
of St. Paul Minnesota, 723 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1986)(in interpreting Utah Code Ann. §
31-18-8, the court recognized that "[t]he statutory alternatives are stated in the
disjunctive, not the conjunctive[,]" and concluded that to prevail under that statute, a
party needed proof of only one of the alternatives listed).
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(Emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the emphasized portion of that provision
"[o]n its face ... protects one's constitutional right to express one's opinion, limited only by
the responsibility for the 'abuse' ofthatright." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999,
1015 (Utah 1994).
Article I § 15 of the Utah Constitution provides in relevant part, "No law shall be
passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." This provision is to be
read in conjunction with Article I § 1, supra, and is deemed "more definitive and inclusive
than the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution]."

West v. Thomson

Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1017 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted).
The Utah Constitution "reflects the positive attitude of the constitution's drafters
toward a free and uninhibited press." West at 1014.
"'Criminal statutes must be scrutinized with particular care; those that make unlawful
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even
if they also have legitimate application.'" I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT llOat^f 15,61 P.3d 1038
(citation omitted).
"In considering whether a statute suffers from overbreadth ca court's first task is to
determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct.'" I.M.L. v. State, at \ 15 (citation omitted).
"A statute will be invalidated for overbreadth only if it 'does not aim specifically at
20

evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit
other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or
the press/" Provo City v. Whatcott 2000UTApp86,1J8,1 P.3d 1113 (UtahCt App. 2000).
Language which is strictly opinion is protected by the Utah Constitution. West 872
P.2d at 1015.7 "'An obvious potential for quashing or muting [free speech] looms large when
[fact finders] attempt to assess the truth of a statement that admits of no method of
verification/" Id. (citation omitted; brackets by the West court). "c[I]t is well understood
that editorial writers and commentators frequently resort to the type of caustic bombast
traditionally used in editorial writing to stimulate public reaction.'" Id. at 1020 (citation
omitted; brackets by the West court).
The communications fraud statute is constitutionally overbroad, because the statute
is not limited to any discrete area of legitimate state control, and does not distinguish between
fact and opinion, and thus portends to punish significant amounts of constitutionally
protected speech. But see, e j ^ West supra.
For instance, newspaper columnists Marianne Jennings and Molly Ivins routinely and

Constitutionally protected opinions are distinguished from actionable fact-bound
statements by analysis of four factors:
(i) the common usage or meaning of the words used; (ii) whether the
statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (iii) the
full context of the statement-for example, the entire article or column--in
which the defamatory statement is made; and (iv) the broader setting in
which the statement appears.
West at 1018.
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intentionally makes bold sarcastic false statements of opinion, as part of their schemes to
obtain something of value - improvements in human behavior and national politics, or sales
of their columns. Because the statute imposes criminal liability for obtaining anything of
value by means of false representations, and does not require proof of intent to defraud, the
columnists' constitutionally-protected political opinions could be prosecuted as second
degree felony counts of communications fraud. Cf. West supra.
"Puffing" and political commentary are constitutionally protected forms of
communication under both article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution and the First
Amendment of the federal Constitution. See, e.g.. West supra. Political candidates and
elected government officials often make inaccurate statements or omit material facts with a
reckless disregard for the truth, in pursuit of elections, in justifying wars, or in accomplishing
any number of other political agendas. Advertisers often communicate inaccurate assertions
about their products with a reckless disregard for the truth, in an effort to achieve sales.
Under the language of the communications fraud statute, the political and commercial
communicators are ostensibly subject to criminal liability. Compare Provo City v. Whatcott
2000 UT App 86,1 P.3d 1113 (striking telephone harassment statute on overbreadth grounds,
because statute criminalized telephone calls involving lewd or lascivious language, or made
with the "intent to annoy, alarm another, threaten, harass, or frighten any person ... or
recklessly creating a risk thereof").
Most false or misleading communications are made to obtain something of value to
22

the person who utters them. False communications inherently involve a scheme or artifice,
because "artifice" is not specifically defined in the Utah Code, but is commonly defined in
broad terms such as "false or insincere behavior", "an artful stratagem" or "trick."
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (19831 at page 106. Under this broad definition,
an artifice always underlies any dishonest communication.
Because criminal liability may be imposed when the object of dishonest behavior is
"anything of value," and because intent to defraud is not an essential element, the
applicability of the second degree felony variant of the statute applies to a virtually limitless
array of dishonest statements or behaviors or omissions.
For instance, a woman might lie about her weight in an effort to curry favor with her
thin friends and to shield herself from embarrassment. Or a man might tell a woman that he
is a Democrat to get a date with her, when he is in fact a Republican. In these scenarios, the
offenders have devised a scheme or artifice to obtain something of value, have
communicated for the purpose of executing the scheme, and ostensibly could be prosecuted
as second degree felons.
While the ordinary person would not expect such common falsehoods to result in
second degree felony criminal liability, the plain and exceedingly broad language of the
communications fraud statute grants prosecutors the discretion to prosecute virtually any
dishonesty whatsoever as a second degree felony. But see. State v. Blowers, 717 P,2d 1321,
1324 (Utah 1986)(Howe, J., concurring)('nIt would certainly be dangerous if the legislature
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could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would,
to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the
government.,f,)(citation omitted).
Because second degree felony liability follows from any false communication,
behavior, or material omission designed to garner "anything of value," the statute sweeps
well beyond any legitimate area of governmental control, and into the realm of free speech
and expression. Compare Provo City v. Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113 (striking
telephone harassment statute on overbreadth grounds, because statute criminalized telephone
calls involving lewd or lascivious language, or made with the "intent to annoy, alarm another,
threaten, harass, or frighten any person ... or recklessly creating a risk thereof").
Because there is no way to construe the communications fraud statute as
constitutional, short of rewriting it or ignoring its plain meaning, the Court should hold the
statute facially invalid regardless of any legitimate application it may have. See, Provo City
v. WilldeiL 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989).
A judicial attempt to rewrite the law would violate the separation of powers doctrine
of the State Constitution, and constitute an invasion of the legislative province of lawmaking.
See, e.g., Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah App.) (M[S]ince it is the
judiciary's duty to interpret the law as the legislature has enacted it, not to rewrite the law as
it sees fit, such arguments are better saved for the legislature."), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356
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(Utah 1993).
2. EQUAL PROTECTION AND UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS
The communications fraud statute grants prosecutors discretion to charge each
communication once regardless of the number of recipients, to charge separately each
communication to "any person" who receives the communication, to aggregate all
communications into a single charge that encompasses an overall "scheme or fraud," to
charge multiple serious offenses on the basis of aggregated damages, or to charge offenses
on the basis of the value of each separate offense. See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1),
(2), and (5),
Despite numerous motions for a bill of particulars (R. 328-333; 1649-51), the State
never specified which communications form the basis of any of the various counts charged
against Norris, what Norris' scheme or artifice was, whatNorris' mens rea was, or the factual
basis for the values classifying the third degree felony charges. But see, e.g., Constitution
of Utah Article I ^[12 (accused has the right to demand to know the "nature and cause of the
accusation against him"); Utah R. Crim P. 4 (entitling defendant to bill of particulars if
necessary to give defendant sufficient notice of offense charged). See also Utah R. Civ. P.
9 (b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity.").8
In Norris' case, the statute was interpreted and applied in several disparate ways. The

8

The civil rules generally apply in criminal cases when the criminal rules do not
provide guidance. See Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e).
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prosecution's theory underlying two counts for each victim in this case was apparently that
Norris communicated to each of them twice - once through a newspaper advertisement, and
once in personal meetings (R. 9-10; R. 1867at221). The evidence at the preliminary hearing
arguably involved many more communications, because Norris had ongoing employment
relationships with many of the victims. See n.2, supra (summarizing preliminary hearing).
It was not clear from the preliminary hearing that all of the victims saw separate newspaper
advertisements, see id., and it appears that one newspaper advertisement or other
communication might be viewed as justifying a separate charge for each person who received
the communication (R. 9-10).
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor argued that the value of the counts could
be determined on the basis of the $1,400 job offer Norris advertised in the newspaper, or on
the basis of the lawsuits he subsequently filed against people, seeking over a thousand dollars
in each suit (R. 1868 at 31-32). He argued that he could have charged a separate count for
each communication received by each victim, including counts for each victim who read a
newspaper article, and for each victim who heard Norris speak in a group meeting (R. 1868
at 34).
In binding over on the twelve counts, Judge Palmer reasoned that Norris misled the
victims with the advertisement that they would be paid $1,400 plus benefits, and in
subsequent meetings, when he led them believe that they would be salaried employees, when
the contracts he had them sign immediately actually reflected that they would be independent
contractors (R. 1868 at 35). He approved of the third degree felony classification of the
charges on the basis that each communication involved a $1,400 misrepresentation, rather
than on the basis of the amount Norris sought to obtain through the scheme (the damages
sought in his lawsuits against the victims), either through each separate lawsuit, or in the
aggregate of all the suits involved in the scheme (R. 1868 at 37).
Judge Watson originally dismissed the case out of circuit court on the theory that the
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aggregated damages of the four original $300 counts elevated the misdemeanor charges
originally filed to the felony level. See Statement of Facts, supra (R. 32,36-37,290,624-27,
682-684, 698), and Judge Dever's ruling on the constitutionality of the statute interpreted it
as requiring each separate communication to be classified on the basis of the aggregated
values of all offenses (R. 773-776).
In district court, however, the prosecution apparently classified the offenses as third
degree felonies on the basis of non-aggregated damages, because if the values had been
combined for all counts, the charges should have been second degree felonies. See, e.g., 7610-1801(l)(d) (1990) (classifying offense as second degree felony if the value is between
$10,000 and $100,000).
A review of the facts patterns of numerous Utah communications fraud cases confirms
that the uncertain terms of the communications fraud statute leaves prosecutors with virtually
unbridled discretion in all cases, and leaves citizens unable to predict the serious
consequences of their actions.
For instance, in State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 425, 2003 WL 22922435 (unpublished
opinion), this Court affirmed one conviction for communications fraud, which was supported
by evidence that the defendant "spoke with the victim five or six times by telephone
concerning payments on the investment." Had he or she been so inclined, the Smith
prosecutor could easily have charged five or six counts on the basis of the five or six
telephone calls.
In contrast, in State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 87,ffif5-23 and 30-41, 76 P.3d 1173,
cert, denied, 84 P.3d 249 (Utah 2003), this Court affirmed multiple convictions for
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communications fraud against a car salesman, which were each apparently premised on
purchases or sales of specific cars, many of which individual transactions involved multiple
communications, and some of which involved more than one victim. Additionally, in some
instances, there were two convictions for the purchase and sale of one vehicle. Id. Rather
than basing the charges on car transactions, the same prosecutor might well have chosen to
charge only one count of communications fraud, as the Smith prosecutor did, or could also
have charged several more counts on the basis of the number of communications and
communication recipients involved.
In State v. Stringhanu 2001 UT App 13, 17 P.3d 1153, this Court affirmed five
convictions for communications fraud, finding that they were supported by evidence that the
defendant organized, controlled, and knew the billing practices of a company, and instructed
an employee to use a doctor's signature stamp on insurance forms, despite the fact that this
doctor did not truly perform any services on the patients. The same prosecutor might have
charged only one count of communications fraud, on the basis of the scheme to defraud, as
the Smith prosecutor did, or could have charged more counts on the basis of the number of
communications and communication recipients involved.
In contrast, in State v. Silva. 2000 UT App 292, 13 P.3d 604, a defendant was
convicted of one count of communications fraud as a result of eight phone calls he made in
an effort to trick one person into paying his bail. This prosecutor might have charged eight
second degree felony counts on the basis of the communications fraud statutory directive that
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each communication is to constitute a separate offense.
In State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997), this Court affirmed one second
degree felony conviction for communications fraud, which was premised on evidence that
the defendant had someone cash between thirty-five and forty checks worth $300 each, or
a worth a total of at least $ 10,500. On these facts, a different prosecutor could have charged
between thirty-five and forty second degree felony charges, or several more, depending on
how many people received the communications in the forged checks.
The varied interpretations and applications of the vague terms of the communications
fraud statute by the judges and prosecutors in this case, and by the Utah prosecutors in the
other cases discussed, supra, confirm the importance of the law, discussed above, requiring
the legislature to clearly define crimes, so that those enforcing the laws are not left with
excessive discretion. See, e.g.. Blowers, supra.

:

When laws are as poorly drafted as the communications fraud statute is, constitutional
rights to equal protection and uniform operation of laws are jeopardized. See, e.g.. Wood v.
University of Utah Medical Center, 67 P.3d 436, 449 2002 UT 134, ffi[ 33-34 (Utah
2002)(recognizing that state constitution requires that all laws apply uniformly to similarly
situated people, and that the federal constitution requires laws to apply in similar fashion to
similarly situated individuals).
Because the communications fraud statute impinges on fundamental constitutional
rights to free speech and expression, this Court should review it with strict scrutiny, to
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determine whether the classifications in the law further a compelling state interest. See, e.g.,
StateinreN.R.. 967 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah App. 1998).
Review of the permutations of the statute applied at various times in Mr. Norris' case,
and in the Utah communications fraud cases discussed above, demonstrates that the
classifications in the statute do not survive strict scrutiny, or even review for rationality,
because the terms of the statute classify between those who will face minor and major
charges, and between one or many charges, without any clear legislative guidance or
rationale.
Reference to State v. MohL 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995), confirms that the
prosecutors should not have such discretion, by virtue of the uniform operation of laws
provision, Article I § 24 of the Utah Constitution.

In striking the juvenile direct filing

provision in Mohi, the Court described the unique application of the state constitutional
provision, stating, "[F]or a law to be constitutional under [the provision], it is not enough that
it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law
does not operate uniformly if 'persons similarly situated1 are not 'treated similarly.'" Id. at
997 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, some brackets by the Court).
Courts applying the uniform operation of laws provision are to identify statutory
classifications, determine whether classes of people subject to the statute are treated in
disparate fashion, and then assess whether the disparate treatment is justified by a reasonable
legislative objective. Id.
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Applying in the context of the communications fraud statute the analysis set forth in
Mohi confirms that the statute violate the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah
Constitution.
Because Utah prosecutors have discretion to either charge each communication
separately, to charge each reception of a fraudulent representation separately, to aggregate
all communications into a single charge that targets an overall "scheme or fraud," and/or to
charge multiple maximum level offenses for each communication based on aggregated
damages, similarly situated communications fraud offenders may well be classified and
treated in wildly disparate fashions, without any legislative consideration of or justification
for the disparity. Compare the facts of this case, with those in Smith, Nichols, Stringham,
Silva, and Ross, supra.
While there might be a legitimate need to prosecute some offenders more harshly than
others, the statutory scheme does not specify in any way how prosecutors are to select which
defendants are prosecuted under any particular theory or interpretation of the statute. Cf.
Mohi at 1002 (excessive prosecutorial discretion permits prosecutors to discriminate against
unpopular groups of people).
The prosecutorial discretion available under the varied interpretations of the illdefined communications fraud statute permits and risks prosecutorial arbitrariness
discrimination, forbidden under federal constitutional law as well. See, Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (prosecutions may not be based on arbitrary classification,
or other unjustifiable standards such as race or religion). The Utah legislature's enactment
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of the vague communications fraud statute does not constitute "constitutionally valid
definition of offenses," but risks and facilitates a prosecution guided by arbitrary and
unjustifiable standards. But see Bordenkircher.
3. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL AND UNDULY RIGOROUS PUNISHMENT
Under subsections 2 and 5 of the communications fraud statute, the statute could be
interpreted as authorizing prosecutors to charge multiple counts of the highest degree
possible for each separate communication on the basis of the aggregate value of the
combined counts.
Also, because communication is defined so broadly, the statute may be interpreted as
permitting a separate charge for each person who receives a communication, regardless of
whether the defendant succeeded in defrauding any of the recipients. See § 76-10-1801 (1)
("Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from
another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the
scheme or artifice is guilty[.]") (Emphasis added).
These interpretations of the language of the communications fraud statute pose
significant constitutional problems.
Aggregation statutes, such as the one at issue here, are normally designed to allow
prosecutors to treat defendants who defraud several persons of small amounts of money like
offenders who have taken a higher amount of money. See, State v. Joles, 492 So. 2d 490,
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494 (La. 19861 cert, denied 479 U.S. 1056(1987). The theory behind such provisions is that
defendants who take a little money from several people are as culpable as those who take a
lot of money from one person. Id. Thus, aggregation provisions allow prosecutors to treat
a person who takes $50 from ten people the same as a person who takes $500 from one
person. Id
But allowing the State to treat multiple misdemeanor counts of fraud the same as
multiple second degree felonies, or to treat one utterance by a defendant as multiple counts
of fraud on the basis of the number of recipients, would drastically and unjustly increase
punishment for communications fraud. Rather than aggregating several minor offenses to
place them on par with one large one, this interpretation of the communication fraud statute
places a minor offender of one or of several minor acts in the same position as a major
offender of multiple large crimes.
This interpretation of the statute runs counter to the portions of the communications
fraud statute which explicitly punish offenders differently depending upon the amount of
money sought to be taken.
Permitting each communication to be counted on the basis of the number of recipients,
and/or punished separately and classified more severely on the basis of the aggregate value
of all objects of communications would run counter to fundamental constitutional law
banning cruel and unusual punishments. Criminal punishments must be proportionate to the
offenses, to comport with the Eighth Amendment and Article I § 9 of the Utah Constitution.
In assessing sentences for compliance with the Eighth Amendment, the courts assesses
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whether a punishment is "excessive or contravene[] evolving standards of decency and
human dignity," State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64 at 1f 46, 993 P.2d 854, 866-67 or if it is
"barbaric, excessive or disproportional to the offense committed." State v. Mace, 921 P.2d
1372, 1377 (Utah 1996).
Article I § 9 of the Utah Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and
unnecessarily rigorous treatment of inmates, has broader language than the Eighth
Amendment, and has been interpreted as requiring inquiry into the specific facts and
circumstances of each case. See State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1986).
As the supreme court recently noted in State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19; 20 P.3d 342,
cert, denied. 534 U.S. 1018 (2001),
A criminal punishment is cruel and unusual under article I, section 9 if it is "so
disproportionate to the offense committed that it 'shocks the moral sense of all
reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.'"
2001 UT l9,1fl[73;20P.3d365.
Clearly, if a petty offender may be punished multiple times for each separate offense,
or be punished multiple times on the basis of one act of uttering a fraudulent statement
received by many, and may be punished each individual time for aggregated damages, this
could readily result in a sentence so disproportionate as to violate the State and federal
constitutions. See, Lafferty, Herrera, supra.
4. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The ambiguity of the communications fraud statute risks violating defendants' right
to be free from multiple prosecutions for the same offense, protected by the Fifth
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Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution.
Under these constitutional provisions, criminal defendants have the fundamental right
to be free from: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense following acquittal; (2) a
second prosecution for the same offense following a conviction; and, (3) multiple
punishments for the same offense. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1998).
Charging defendants with multiple counts under the same statute implicates the last
of these protections. State v. Turner, 6 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). Courts
assessing such charges for compliance with the law of double jeopardy assess whether the
"unit of prosecution" is clearly defined by the legislature. Id.; State v. Adel, 965 P. 2d 1072,
1074 (Wash. 1998). While legislatures can define crimes and punishments (as long as the
laws are not cruel and unusual or unduly rigorous), "double jeopardy protects a defendant
from being convicted twice under the same statute for committing just one unit of the crime."

Ii
The communications fraud statute fails to clearly define the unit of prosecution.
The statute does not specify whether the State can charge multiple small offenses as multiple
large offenses, or can elevate the level of each charge with the amount sought to be obtained
from all communications made as part of a scheme, or whether one communication is one
offense, or whether one communication received by many recipients is many offenses.
Under some ostensibly legitimate interpretations of the language of the
communications fraud statute, the vagueness of the statute thus risks violation of the law of
double jeopardy. See, e.g., Adel supra.
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While federal law encourages trial courts to construe statutes with lenity in such
circumstances, see, id, under the unique separation of powers provision of the Utah
Constitution, this Court should refrain from effectively rewriting the legislature's poorly
drafted law. See, e ^ , Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah App.) ("[S]ince
it is the judiciary's duty to interpret the law as the legislature has enacted it, not to rewrite the
law as it sees fit, such arguments are better saved for the legislature.M), cert, denied, 862 P.2d
1356 (Utah 1993).
Because the communications fraud statute prohibits constitutionally protected speech,
because persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute's meaning and
differ as to its application, because prosecutors have excessive discretion to charge similarly
situated offenders in disparate fashion, because some interpretations of the statute risk
violations of the law against cruel, unusual and unduly rigorous punishment and against
double jeopardy, this Court should strike the statute on constitutional grounds. See, e.g.,
Hoffman; West supra.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION
OVER NORRIS'CASE.
A. THERE WAS NO JURISDICTION IN THE LOWER COURT WHILE THE CASE
WAS PENDING IN THE APPELLATE COURTS.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4 (2003) provides, "No person shall be punished for a public
offense until convicted in a court having jurisdiction."
As is detailed in the Statement of Facts, supra, the information in the instant case was
filed before the remittitur issued from the appeals stemming from the original misdemeanor
case prosecuted by West Valley City in the name of the State.
The scheme and victims alleged in the three cases filed after the original West Valley
case were the same as those involved in the West Valley case, and four of the State's final
victims were the original victims in West Valley's state case (e.g. R. 1860 at 5-10, 12-13,
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20).
Particularly where the classification of each offense was at times determined by the
judges on the basis of the aggregate damages in the overall scheme, and particularly where
the successive informations were all based on the same original police report (9,53, 59,218223), the charges should all have been brought together before one court by one prosecutorial
entity. See, e ^ Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2) (2003) (multiple offenses within the
jurisdiction of one court, and known to the prosecutor at the time of the arraignment, should
be tried together); Utah R. Crim P. 9.5 (all offenses arising out of a single criminal episode
should be prosecuted before one court by one prosecutorial entity). Compare, e.g.. State v.
Mead, 27 P.3d 1115 (Utah 2001) (murder and conspiracy charges were properly charged and
tried together, despite the fact that the acts underlying the charges occurred weeks apart,
because they involved the same criminal objective and were thus incident to one single
criminal episode, and properly joined under 9.5 and 76-1-402).
By reviewing Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Company,
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) (per curiam), this Court can confirm that the trial court failed to
obtain subject matter jurisdiction over this last case filed, because the information which was
filed before the remittitur issued properly was void and a nullity.
In Hi-Country, a trial court modified its judgment in accordance with an appellate
decision from this Court, before the Utah Supreme Court disposed of a petition for a writ of
certiorari. See id., at 305-06. The court addressed several related jurisdictional issues,
beginning with the premise that a trial court does not have jurisdiction over a case which is
pending on appeal. Id. at 306. The court noted that this Court's issuance of the remittitur
before the certiorari petition was filed did not vest jurisdiction in the trial court, because the
remittitur was premature and should not have issued until the expiration of time for filing a
petition for certiorari. Id. The court explained that if proceedings may occur simultaneously
in different courts in one case, this disserves judicial economy and renders the case a
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"proverbial'moving target.'" Id. at 307.

it was entered when the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and was void. Id.
In the instant matter, West Valley City, acting in the name of the State of Utah,

Watson dismissed it because he interpreted the communications fraud statute as requiring
felony charges in this case, which at that time, belonged in district, not circuit court.
Despite the ongoing proceedings in this Court, and then Utah Supreme Court, and then
1 Inifnl States ^upiciiii" ( mni in IIIK ^ryeast' llicShli f rfiiMilalh iHiiln) die duiif*^ Ivfoiv
the remittitur properly issued, and before the lower courts could properly obtain subject
matter jurisdiction over Mr. Norris. See Hi-Country, supra.
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e.g., Transworld Systems Inc. v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah 1990) (proceedings
conducted without jurisdiction are nullities and \oid).

and the filing of the last case with Judge Reese when case number 971005698 had pending
a motion to dismiss with prejudice with Judge Dever, also violated the concurrent jurisdiction
......

i has been recognized ,.. ; ;*.;. I** years. As the court explained in Escalante

Lu. \ Ivciit "' V m
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"Where two actions between the same parties, on the same subject, and to test

the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent jurisdiction,
the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to the
administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction and may dispose of
the whole controversy, and no court of coordinate power is at liberty to
interfere with its action. This rule rests upon comity and the necessity of
avoiding conflict in the execution ofjudgments by independent courts, and is
a necessary one because any other rule would unavoidably lead to perpetual
collision and be productive of most calamitous results."
Id. at 278 (citation omitted).
The convoluted procedural history of this case, and Mr. Norris' experiences in having
been repeatedly charged, arrested and hailed before so many different courts to answer so
many different charges and theories premised on the same underlying facts, prove the validity
of, and the importance of complying with, the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. See id. See,
also, e.g., Nielsonv. Schiller, 66 P. 2d 365, 366 (Utah 1937) (refiling elements of case in one
court while other elements are pending in another court of concurrent jurisdiction "is
abhorrent to the orderly procedure and determination of causes in courts of concurrent
jurisdiction and cannot do other than inject confusion into the orderly procedure of the
courts.").
B. THE MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS VIOLATED NORRIS' RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS.
Assuming that the pendency of the appellate proceedings did not prevent the
attachment of subject matter jurisdiction under Hi-Country, supra, but especially because of
the obvious lack of jurisdiction, the government's overall course of conduct in this case
should have resulted in the dismissal with prejudice of the ultimate charges.
The lower courts were clearly in error in failing to recognize their power to stop the
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prosecutors from refiling this case (e.j^. \< " . k. i s 7 J at 70), because our constitutions
empower the courts to protect our citizens from such prosecutorial abuses.
'.i.v. rederal constitution is designed w, p r o k c i i-^.opk Horn "being tv\ue pu; in
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Courts interpreting the constitution recognize that criminal prosecutions cause "personal
strain, public embarrassment, and expense." Id. Courts recognize that the boundless

that such repeated attempts may increase "the possibility of an in nocent per son being
wrongfully convicted. Id.
Courts have held that due process forbids the government to harass citizens with
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Motor Company, 273 F.Supp. 810 (N.D. 111. 1967); PI I t Inc. v. United States Department
of Justice, 743 F.Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1990); Freedburg v. United States Department of Justice,
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duplicative indictments for multiple conspiracies arising out of one transaction, due process
requires fundamental fairness and fair play, and will not permit the government to harass a
nging multiple chai ges, and requiring the defendant;. i;ii^jk-. in
different courts.
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corporations must j u m p through a hoop at their own expense each time it commands." Id.
at 819-820 (citations omitted).
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In State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the
opinions of numerous courts recognizing the potential for abuse and harassment inherent in
prosecutorial power to refile cases, stating, "the prosecutor's good faith is a fragile protection
for the accused." Id. at 647. The court held that the due process guarantee in Article I § 7
of the Utah Constitution, and principles of fundamental fairness prohibit prosecutors from
refiling criminal charges previously dismissed for insufficient evidence at the preliminary
hearing, absent a showing of new or previously unavailable evidence or other good cause.
See id. at 646-48. The court also established the requirement that when prosecutors do refile
cases dismissed for insufficient evidence, they must refile them before the original magistrate
when possible, rather than forum shop. Id. at 647-48.
In State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P.3d 767, the court expanded on this important
area of the law, stating that the "lodestar of Brickey... is fundamental fairness," and that due
process presumptively bars refiling when "potential abusive practices are involved." Id. at
TIH 15 and 16.
The court recognized that criminal defendants always experience some level of
oppression and harassment, and emphasized that courts are compelled to intervene under the
due process precedents in cases involving "potential bad faith or misconduct of the
prosecutors." Id. at ^[22.
The Morgan court found that the refiling in that case did not involve bad faith,
because the prosecutor had innocently miscalculated the quantum of evidence necessary to
obtain a bindover, had not engaged in forum shopping, did not refile to harass the defendant,
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and did not withhold evidence from the defendant at the first preliminary hearing to tin
tactical advantage. Id. at 25.
Iii ::: : iiti ast, the go v ei nment filed and re filed this case against A 11. ,\ 0111:,fourseparate
times, beginning with four misdemean •
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the government's appeal from the dismissal of that West Valley City case was pending in one
form or another in this Coin t, in the Utah Supreme Court, and in the United States Supreme

Ann. §76-l-302(l)(b) (2002), the government repeatedly charged Norris again, first with
eleven counts of third degree felony communications fraud, based on the same facts as the
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appeal in case number 941004949 was pending, and when case number 971005698 had
pending a motion to disniiss with prejudice with Judge Dever, the government charged
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doubling the bail (R. 189-199).
The last two cases and the last three informations (R. 9, 59, 218-223) were all
explicitly premised on the police report *
to Judge Hildf •

•) which should have been expunged pursuant
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811,813 (Utah 1990) (expunged records are to be sealed, and may not be referred to or relied
on in subsequent proceedings). The prosecution's lack of good faith on this point is
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illustrated by the prosecutor's inconsistent representations relating to the expungement issue.9
The third and fourth informations represented that there had been no prior related
cases (R. 60, 11), when that was certainly not the case. But see, e.g., Brickey, supra
(requiring prosecutors to refile cases previously dismissed for insufficient evidence with
same magistrate who entered the dismissal order).
The prosecutors certainly must have known that the refilings were illegal, because of
all of the black letter law discussed above in this point of the brief, and because Judge Palmer
quashed the first refiled charges and ruled that he would not hear the case until the West
Valley case was completely disposed of (R. 131, 166).
The prosecution's refiling of the case effectively violated Judge Palmer's ruling, the
spirit of Brickey, and the law of the case doctrine, which generally prevents "'one district
court judge [from] overruling] another district court judge of equal authority.'" Red Flame
Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22,ffif4 and 5, 996 P.2d 540.
After Judge Dever dismissed the second refiled charges and ruled that the State could
not refile until the remittitur issued (R. 34, 166; R. 1860 at 27), the State then went to Judge
Reese and refiled not just the ten charges, but twenty, all involving the same victims and

9

As noted above, While the prosecutor, Ernie Jones, had earlier argued at the
December 4, 1998 hearing before Judge Dever that the State opted not to fight Norris'
expungement petition when he filed it because the prosecution did not believe that the
expungement would prevent them from refiling (R. 766), in the October 21, 1999 hearing
before Judge Reese, the same prosecutor then told just Reese that he "never never"
received the expungement petition until after the fact, and that if the prosecution had
received notice that he was trying to expunge his records, they "would have been in there
objecting." (R. 1873 at 78; R. 131).
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same scheme (R. 9-11, 62).
After the prosecutors effectively violated Judge Palmer's and Judge Dever's rulings,
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Reese reminded them that they could not proceed on the case until the remittitur arrived in
the West Valley appeal (R. 156).
Given the laA v and this h istoi 3 • of • :oi 11 t orders, the prosecutors certainly should have
known better than i
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The time and finances and anxiety the government has cost Mr. Norris with tins
course of conduct cannot be calculated. As a direct result of the prosecution's disregard for
"

•'*

•

•

research and writing seized. After he exhausted hia personal resources m nib ddVns;
resorted to filing numerous pleadings pro se, and repeatedly sought the appointment of
counsel in an effort to protect his rights when he became indigent. See, generally, e.g., R.
36-46
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Given the escalation of the charges from four misdemeanors to twenty third degree
felonies (with concomitant increases in bail), after Norris asserted his rights on appeal and
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vindictiveness, which also violates due process of law. See, e.g.. United States v. Sarracino,
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i • Hr. 2003) (when prosecutorial functions are exercised to punish
Ki\i i ti/i-i •> v-^stitutes prose, atonal vindictiveness); State v.
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Brule, 981 P.2d 782, 784 (N.M. 1999) (in selecting de novo standard of review for claim of
prosecutorial vindictiveness, the court recognized, that "while all forms of prosecutorial
misconduct may impinge to some degree on a defendant's right to due process, prosecutorial
vindictiveness constitutes a particularly severe, prejudicial, and repugnant due process
violation.").
Given the history of prosecutorial harassment, vindictiveness, and oppression in the
instant matter, this Court should order the information underlying Norris' convictions
dismissed on due process grounds and forbid the government to proceed further against
Norris in this case. See Brickey; American Honda, supra.
C. THIS JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER IT WAS FULLY PRESERVED IN THE CONDITIONAL PLEA.
The plea agreement in the file contemplates that Mr Norris has preserved this issue
of the court's lack of jurisdiction over him (R. 1822).10 However, the plea colloquy creates
some ambiguity with regard to this issue (R. 1883 at 14).n

10

The agreement provides:

2. Defendant agrees to waive all appellate rights in relations to the
case with the exception of narrow issues of the constitutionality of the
charging statute and jurisdictional issues previously raised with the Court
and presently the subject of the appeal from judgment in the Fourth District
Court case, which is presently on appeal.
(R. 1822).
1

during the plea colloquy, Judge Reese initially informed Norris that the only
issue he was reserving for appeal was the overbreadth and vagueness of the
communications fraud statute (R. 1883 at 13). Norris indicated that he had preserved
the "jurisdictional issues objection," and when the court inquired, trial counsel indicated
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Regardless of whether the issue was properly preserved in the conditional plea, the
issue involves a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, both because the pendency of the West

subject matterjurisdiction, see, ej^, High-Countrv sunn t, and because the prosecution's due
process violations foreclosed jurisdiction from attaching when this case was refiled the last
time, see, e.g., Morgan; American Honda, supra

e.g., James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570-71 (Utah App. 1998) ("Jurisdiction of the subject
matter is derived from the law It can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the
ac ::i is = d Ob jecti :)iit : 'the ji u isdiction> Df the com to\ ei the subject matter may be urged at any
stage of the proceedings, and the right to make s-*v*
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By reviewing Blackledge v. Perry, 4171 s . S.21(1974), this Court can confirm that the
due process violations which led up to and mcludeu IIIL filing of the final twenty charges

regardless of whether the conditional plea expressly reserved the right to raise the issue on
appeal.

that he thought Norris was referring to the Fourth District Court case (R. 18SJ at 1 J).
After further discussion, Judge Reese asked Norris if he understood he was waiving all
issues specific to this case, anything that may have happened when Judges Reese or
Dever had the case, and any ruling that either judge may have made, and was preserving
only the constitutional challenges and any issue raised in the Fourth District Appeal that
was not specific to this case (R. 1883 at 14) Norris agreed (R ! ss - at 14)? and then
stated that he was only preserving challenges to issues of law, not of fact (R. 1883 at 15).
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In Blackledge, North Carolina prosecuted Mr. Blackledge for a misdemeanor,. assault
with a deadly weapon, and after he succeeded in obtaining a reversal on appeal, North
Carolina prosecuted him for the very same underlying facts, but the second time charged a
felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflict serious bodily injury.
Id. at 22-23. After Blackledge pled guilty, he filed for habeas corpus in federal court, and
the district court found that the prosecutor's conduct violated Blackledge's rights against
double jeopardy, and that the entry of his plea did not foreclose his obtaining habeas relief.
Id. at 24.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding that while there
was no evidence of prosecutorial malice in Blackledge's case, due process would not permit
the potential for prosecutorial vindictiveness inherent in a process allowing prosecutors to
have the power to refile cases with more serious charges after the appeals, and to thereby
discourage people from exercising their appellate rights. Id. at 27-29.
The Court found that Blackledge's guilty plea to the felony did not foreclose the
courts from relieving him of the due process violation, because his case did not involve
simple constitutional violations which occurred before he entered his plea. Id. at 30. Rather,
his case involved "the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge." Id.
Stated another way, "Having chosen originally to proceed on the misdemeanor charge in the
District Court, the State of North Carolina was, under the facts of this case, simply precluded
by the Due Process Clause from calling upon the respondent to answer to the more serious
charge[.]"Id.
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Blackledge is fully consistent with longstanding Utah law, which recognizes that the
district court's subject matter jurisdiction is always contingent on the proper filing of the
information, see, e ^ , State v. Freeman, 71 I \ Jld I %, IW 11 Itali 1 K).\ IK and that a defendant
who enter-- \ **-ui1ty plea does not warsre challenges to the coi ii t'spow ei It D adji idicatehis :ase
or to the court's subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930
(Utah 1992).

first four misdemeanor case was pending, and while the lower courts had no jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Hi-Country, supra. The prosecution's thrice repeated filings of more severe felony
charges, and repeated disruptions <.<
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Morgan, supra. Cf. Blackledge.
Norris' pursuit of his appellate rights in the misdemeanor case, and his efforts to
dismiss the felony cases and expunge the i ecoi (I c f the first dismissed case SIUJL.^; ;.wi have
resulted in the prosecution's filing of more seven1 frlonv charges firsl dn, then twenty, or in the drastic increases in Norris' bail. Cf. Blackledge, supra.
Because this case invoh es due process violations which should have foreclosed the
i U

"

, M

4

i.-

* -ti

*i i .

iced

for him to come yet again to court to answer the more serious charges, this Coiii1 has full
authority to address the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Blackledge,
supra.
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in.
THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS ALL ASPECTS
OF THE ARGUMENTS RAISED ON APPEAL.
To the degree that the prior lawyers on this case did not preserve the issues discussed
above, this Court should nonetheless address and correct the errors under the plain error
and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines.
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness prong
may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight
than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8
(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Norris must demonstrate that trial
counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that
this objectively deficient performance was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d
516, 521 (Utah), cert denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994).
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all
issues in the lower court. See, e ^ , State v. Smedlev, 2003 UT App 79 at % 10,67 P.3d 1005.
The violations of law addressed herein should have been plain to the trial lawyers and
the lower courts because the fundamental principles of law discussed in points I and II were
well-established at the time of the violations, and just as the lower courts should have
followed the controlling law, the trial lawyers had the duty to assert the law and issues on
Norris's behalf. See, e.g., Smedlev, supra.
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Because Norris would not stand convicted, and should never have been charged in the
absence of the errors, the errors were highly prejudicial.

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the individual and cumulative errors undermining Norris' convictions,
.;urt should order the uui coin t to permit Nonis u- „ undraw his pleas, and should
or de t: th : iisfl ;i issa 1 • : i I k i ris5 case
DATED April 27, 2004.

El\zatMh
Attorney for Mr

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, first class postage prepaid, two true and correct copies
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

Coiislilufiun n( i i|,ih Ann I" I \ 1
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.
(\wstitution of Utah, Article I § 7
\ o p.-* son shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article ifc'i
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel
and unusual punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 (1994)
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice pi it in jeopardy for the same
offense.

Tslo law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech oi of the press
criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it
shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with
good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have
the right to determine the law and the fact.
i

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 24
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Constitution of Utah, Article V § 1
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed
or permitted.
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in:
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of
the State of Utah; and
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2).
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the conditions, in
the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption
upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds
vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the
voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or
prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be
adopted upon approval of two-thirds of those voting.
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions, in
the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the county,
city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as
provided by statute; or
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or
town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or
ordinance may take effect.
United States Constitution, Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
ii

free exercise thereof ; or abridging the 'freedom of speech, or of the pi ess. or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to «uy\vci lor a capital, or otherwise infamous u
.nics:> ^i. a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the UUK or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use. without just compensation.
, n.l/

.ii
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Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in 'the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
I

(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for:
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is committed;
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall be commenced within two years
after it is committed; and
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year after it is committed.
(2) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing of an indictmeir
uu s
' or upon the filing of a complaint or information.
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\!i

,

'i

II

III

>

1,'IHH)

iii

(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a
prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode,
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is
arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so
included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1990)
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is $100 or less;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
iv

sought to be uuiamcu ib more than $100 but -does not exceed $1,000;
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property; money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed $10,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed $100,000;
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defra
than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in
Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the!
<
•••>•• • -«-n-\ . !• r, J;
^ffrnsr tkNmlvd
in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary
element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of
communication fraud.
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (i; means to bestow, convey, make
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone,
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made oi n;.:
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the tilith
Utah Code Ami. § 76-10-1801 (1995)
(1) \ny person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the n opnh money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is less than $300;
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000;
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(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other
than the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in
Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described
in Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary
element of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of
communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information,
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone,
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4(2003)
No person shall be punished for a public offense until convicted in a court having
jurisdiction.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of
an organized association of persons that is made a party. A party may raise an issue as to
the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, by specific negative
averment, which shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue,
the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same
vi

on the trial.
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant \\ hen a pait) cu c^> not know the name of an
adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party
may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name: provided, that when the
true name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be
amended accordingly.
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest 01 unkiu;v\n parties, in an aaion to
quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the
pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming
any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the
pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto "
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice.
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been
performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made
specifically and with particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance
or occurrence shall on the trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence.
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver
that the document was issued or the act done in compliance w ith law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign com t, judicial
or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or
decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of
jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with particularity and when so made the party
pleading the judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted
jurisdictional facts.
(f) Time and place. For tiK j -^ j . se 01 icsung me suiiiciency of a pleading, averments of
time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material matter.
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated,
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state
the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute
specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation
is controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the tr 0 «*^ fs<^s
showing that the cause of action is so barred.
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance
of any political subdivision thereof 01 a right deri\ed from such statute or ordinance, it is
r\n M> refer to such statute 01 ordinance b\ its title an 1 the da\ o\^ its passage or by
vn

its section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or
ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof.
(j) Libel and slander.
(j)(l) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set
forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter
out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was
published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party
alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken.
(j)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may
allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification
or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances.
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the
judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rales shall apply to all special statutory
proceedings, except insofar as such rales are by their nature clearly inapplicable. Where a
statute provides for procedure by reference to any part of the former Code of Civil
Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance with these rales.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rales shall not apply to proceedings in uncontested
probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the
joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of any judgment or order entered.
(c) Application to small claims. These rales shall not apply to small proceedings except as
expressly incorporated in the Small Claims Rules.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board or agency.
These rales shall apply to the practice and procedure in appealing from or obtaining a
review of any order, ruling or other action of an administrative board or agency, except
insofar as the specific statutory procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is
in conflict or inconsistent with these rales.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rales of procedure shall also govern in any
aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rale, provided,
that any rale so applied does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is
viii

being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or
by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant
notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where
appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need
not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities,
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may be obtained
through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice
need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or information
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended
so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense upon the same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare
his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the court
may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A
bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions
as justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited
to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the essential elements of the
particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained
therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception exci lse 01 pi o \ ' iso contained ii 1 till ::
statute creating or defining the offense.
(Ii) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless
they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or informati
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based
shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity
but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon
request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the
names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before
the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a
ix

corporation shall be the same as against a natural person.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.5
(l)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging
multiple offenses, which may include violations of state laws, county ordinances, or
municipal ordinances and arising from a single criminal episode as defined by Section 761-401, shall be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the
highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged.
(l)(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not be separated
except by order of the court and for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or
information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial
entity shall prosecute the offenses.
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FORMATIONS

Keith L. Stoney (3868)
City Prosecutor
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley Citv, UT 84119
(801) 963-3331
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC)
Plaintiff,

I N F O R M A T I O N

v.
C a s e No. C\ U\. I 0 0 4 ^ 1 ^ 1 m C L ;

NORRIS, RICHARD F.
67 8 WILLIAMSBURG
SANDY, UTAH
5/15/55
Defendant.

The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 12 MAY 1994,
at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West Valley City, Utah,
did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of:

COUNT 1:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

COUNT 2:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

COUNT 3:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

COUNT 4:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A"

This information
following witnesses:

is based on evidence obtained

from the

MICHAEL MABRY
BONNIE GESSEL
JOAN MATTSON
KAYLYNN CROSBY
LISA STAUFFER
SHERRY FRANCIS
DOUG FAY
xi

00621

DETECTIVE PLOTNICX**PLEASE LET US KNOW
WITNESSES**

IF THERE ARE ADDITIONAL

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant: bases this information on the following:
WITNESSES STATED rO OFFICERS, THE DEFEN DANT ON FOUR DIFFERENT
OCCASIONS, UNIxAWFULLY DEFRAUDED ANOTHER OR OBTAINED FROM ANOTHER,
MONEY, PROPERTY, OR ANYTHING OF VALUE BY MEANS OF FALSE OR
FRAUDULENT PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES, OR MATERIAL
OMISSIONS, AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH ANY PERSON
BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME;
THE DEFENDANT HAS NO BUSINESS LICENSE TO Q2ERATE IN WEST VALLEY AND
NO CURRENT RESIDENCE.
THE DEFENDANT' S^Jtf*ffiREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN,
THEREFORE, THE CITY R EQUESTS ft WARRANT^F .ARREST,,
Complain

9A-'253 76, DRf N0RRIS.R2
PTC: ,
December ,19,

Xll

2

fifffj!:

:o

Keith L. Stoney (3868)
Valerie J. O'Brien (6624)
David L. Clark (6199)
City Prosecutor
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
(801) 963-3344
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT/ STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC)
:
:

Plaintiff,

v.

:

N O R R I S , RICHARD F .
6 7 8 WILLIAMSBURG
SANDY, UTAH
5/15/55

:
•
:

Defendant.

The

undersigned,

A M E N D E D
I N F O R M A T I O N
Case No.

941004929

:

KEITH

L.

STONEY,

under

oath,

states

on

information and belief that the defendant, on or about MARCH, APRIL
AND/OR MAY OF 1993, at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West
Valley City, Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of:

COUNT 1:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH,
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 93 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS,
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND
INDIRECTLY TO MICHAEL MABRY BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME.

COUNT 2:

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH,
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR
OBTAIN .MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS,
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND
xiii
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INDIRECTL Y TO' J OAN MATTSON BY AN Y MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME.
COUNT 3-

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH,
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING
MORE THAN $3 00.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS,
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND
INDIRECTLY TO LISA STAUFFER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME.

COUNT

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS
AMENDED, CLASS M A M MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH,
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING
MORE THAN $3 00.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS,
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND
INDIRECTLY TO SUSAN HUNTER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME.

This Information
following witnesses:

evidence

is bas>

MICHAEL MAJBRY
BONNIE GESSEL
JOAN MATTSON
KAYLYNN CROSBY
LISA STAUFFER
SHERRY FRANCIS
DOUG FAY
DETECTIVE PLOTNICK**PLEASE
WITNESSES**
SUSAN HI INTER

LET US KNOW

obtained

from

the

IF THERE AR.E ADD ITIONAL

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this information en i the following: • " •
RICHARD NORRIS PLACED A NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT FOR A $1400.00 A

2
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MONTH SALARIED, WITH BENEFITS, POSITION FOR A DIET COUNSELOR, WHEN,
IN FACT, THE POSITION HE WAS OFFERING TO THE VICTIM WAS NOT A
POSITION OF THAT NATURE OR THE NATURE ADVERTISED OR SOLICITED OR
PROMISED SUCH THAT:
A.
B.
C.
D.

H

J
K.
L.

THE POSITION WAS NOT A SALARIED JOB WITH BENEFITS, OR
THE POSITION WAS NOT AS A DIET COUNSELOR, OR
THE POSITION WAS FOR COMMISSIONED SALES OF A DIET PRODUCT, OR
THE CONTRACT MR. NORRIS REQUIRED WAS NOT, WHAT HE SAID IT WAS
FOR AND AMOUNTED TO A DEBT OF OVER $309 TO EACH VICTIM THAT
SIGNED IT, OR
THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT A DIET PRODUCT, OR
THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT APPROVED AS A DIET PRODUCT, OR
THE AMOUNT OF PRODUCT SOLD TO THE VICTIM WAS MORE THAN THE
AMOUNT AGREED UPON BY AND PROMISED BY MR. NORRIS, HENCE THE
DEBT WAS GREATER THAN INTENDED
MR. NORRIS, AFTER THE SALE, WOULD NOT ACCEPT RETURNS OF THE
PRODUCT AS PREVIOUSLY INSINUATED, PROMISED OR AGREED, OR
MR. NORRIS KNEW THAT THE PRODUCT WAS ' NOT WHAT HE STATED IT
WAS, OR
MR. NORRIS USED THIS SCHEME KNOWING PEOPLE COULD NOT LIVE UP
TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACT, OR
MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE
VICTIMS, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THE VICTIMS TO MAKE MONEY FOR
HIS COMPANY, OR
MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY <3T~^UE OBLIGATION OF THE
VICTIM, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THEJrVTT^IMS FOR THE FALSE
VALUES OF THE PRODUCT..

Complainant

94-25376, DR/CP, NORRIS.R2
PTC: ,
October 2, 1995
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNIE W.JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: EW Jones
1
: ficdto: EW Jones

Plaintiff,
BAIL: $75,000.00
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail

-vsRICHARDF. NORR1S
AKA

DOB 05/15/1955,

INFORMATION

!

.-,.N..

961 ^

^

f

Defendant.
ine undersigned BrooK notnick ,\c^
on information and belief that the defendant

;

t,

s

if„ inidci mill • lates

COU NT I
COMMUNICATION o rivAuu, a iliird Degree Felony , at 33^2 west JOUU
e
,,,, ,,iMn
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in ™ '
of Ti*
10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as ,
*~ *
defendant,
RICHARD F. NORMS, a rart\ u, the offense, devised a
to_defiaud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice orfraud,and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNT III
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNTV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Fhird Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, In v iolation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from, another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the vo1,,~ - r * V
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUN r vii
COMMUNICA I IONS FRAU D, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that 'the defendant,
RICHARD F, NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00,
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COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNTX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

XJX

00052

INFORMATION
STATE OF UTAH v RICHARD i\ ! IORRIS
DAO No. 96016093
Page 5

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
B. Flotnick; S. Hum K
u. ucwci, ». vu ^,i > nunier; i-_. ci*.
Stauffer; K. Utley: S * - n vQ FmvH r " i ! , ^ n Duflfin <m.i s

y, L

PRQH/ VBLE CAUSES I A I EMEN I i
Your Affiant bases this Informal ii in iiiiii |n Ilin1 import /ifM ir\17(} mu\ ihr tollman)'
1
During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran, an advertisement in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employm
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defend
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised, i UL
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of
these people.
2.
me aeiuKdL
. ^v^ai employees at his business that he never intended to
fulfill any of the promise* m Uie ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.
BROOK PLOTNICK, Affiant
Subscribed aiu* .->worr ' * '*•
day of Octobci, k_ _.

this

MAGISTRATE
Authorized for presentmenwnd filing:
E. NEAL GUNNARSO^D/strict Attorney

Deputy'District Attorney, October 1, 1996
jp/96016093
/
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNIE W.JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

ROLL CALL H - I 0 - T 9
JUDGE
Q&J&Z.

0q0d

?

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Screened by: EW Jones
Assigned to: EW Jones

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

BAIL: $75,000.00
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail

-vsRICHARD F. NORRIS
AKA
OTN
Defendant.

AMENDED
INFORMATION

DOB 05/15/1955,

Case No.

9 7

1 O

O S f c ^

F $

The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Joan Mattson or to obtain from another Joan Mattson or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
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COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Mike Mabry or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT III
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Kay Utley or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Chris Atkin or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
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COUNTV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Randy Hunter or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNT VI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud Joy
Slotsvic or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Kay Loemon or to obtain from Kay Loemon money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNTVIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Sherry Francis or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Sherry Bailey or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT X
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud
Sue Hunter or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
B. Plotnick; S. Humphrey; B. Gessel; J. Mattson; S. Hunter; K. Crosby; M. Mabry; L.
Stauffer; K. Utley; S. Francis; G. Fowler; K. Noland; D. Duffin and S. Lebaron.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following:
1.
During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of
these people.
2.
The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.
„ .
r \ _^-,^~~^
^

^

. a

WQgSC?

BROOK PLOTNICK, Affiant
Subscribed
day of

J^-

K. HILDEB

Authorized for presentment and filing:
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, District Attorney

Mu

:y, March
M£
Deputy DistricyAttorney,
27,1997
jp/96016093
XXV
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County
Prior related cases: None
Officers Badge No. 8049
Agency Case Number: 94-25376
Arrest Date:
Jail Booking Number:
Defendant's Sex: Male
Defendant's Social Security Number:
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Ut
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNEST ]W. JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: E. Jones
Assigned to: E. Jones

Plaintiff,
BAIL: $150,000.00
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail

-vs-

INFORMATION

RICHARD F. NORRIS
DOB 05/15/55,
OTN
Case NoT

710Z>$&> fc

Defendant.
The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant, committed the <Mimds of:

COUNT!

A

C)T^

H

L

/

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a T^rr&TfSg^Mony,
at 2392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense,'devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.06.

COUNT HI

X^h&Jl 0*

COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Thirdfoe£iV>el^ny, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
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COUNTY
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
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COUNT ¥111
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as ;a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNTX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as ja party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
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COUNT XI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XIV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNT XV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNT XVI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XVII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XVIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XVIIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Officer Brook Plotnick, S. Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, Kay Crosby,
Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. Duffin and S.
Lebaron.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following:
1.
During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of
these people.
2.

The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to
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fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.

^

C2

BROOK PLOTNICK
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn ^-ttfqre"fflftO}is
day of May, 1997. J>\f^X
^
^

MAGISTRATE \ t

IS

A:%r.

Authorized for presentment and filing:
E. NEAL GUNNARSON^D/strict Attorney

t/A
Deputy District Atto:
'/TLA-.

f*s-&^

May 15,1997
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County
Prior related cases: none
Officer's Badge No. 8049
Agency Case Number: 94-25376
Arrest Date:
Jail Booking Number:
Defendant's Sex: Male
Defendant's Social Security Number:
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Utah

00011

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-363-7900

FILED DIS ~ ^ T COURT
Third Judk .District

APR 16 1999
8ALT LAKE COUNTY

- * * =

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
INFORMATION

-vsRICHARD F. NORRIS
DOB 5/15/55

Case No. 971008355FS

Defendant.
The undersigned Ernest W. Jones, Deputy District Attorney, under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of:
COUNT I
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT II
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNT III
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false
of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a
party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for
the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of the
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNTV
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $ 1,000.00.
COUNTVI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT VII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT VIII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT IX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNTX
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
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COUNT XI
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.
COUNT XII
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76,
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who,
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00.

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Officer Brook Plotnick, Officer Steve Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter,
Kay Crosby, Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D.
Duffin and S. Labaron.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this Information on police report no. 94-25376 and the following:
1.
During the spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisment in the newspaper.
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtaine djudgments against many of
these people.
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2.
The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to
cover up this scheme.

r.

-/l^^

/

L./sns-**-

ERNESf W. JONES
Affiant
Subscribed
day of April

MAGISTRAL
Authorized for presentment and filing:
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney

Deputy District Attprney
amended April 5, 1999
msw/97006614
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LOWER COURT RULINGS

JUDGE WATSON'S SIGNED DOCKET ENTRY OF JUNE 6, 1996 DISMISSING
WEST VALLEY CASE

D O C K E T
CIRCUIT COURT - WVC
iant

Page
1
JUNE 6, 19 9 6
1:54 PM
WVC Case: 941004929 MC
Agency No.: WVC
THURSDAY

Citation:

DRRIS, RICHARD F

City Misdemeanor
Judge: EDWARD A. WATSON

392 WEST 3 500 SOUTH
EST VALLEY CITY
UT 84119

NO OTN # FOR THIS CASE
es
Bail
iolation Date: 05/12/94
76-10-1801
.00
. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
Sev: MA
76-10-1801
.00
. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
Sev: MA
76-10-1801
.00
. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
Sev: MA
76-10-1801
.00
:. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
Sev: MA
iedings
)/94 Case filed on 12/20/94.
JLB
Warrant ordered
JLB
WARRANT OF ARREST issued - JUDGE WBB
JLB
Other: city warrant of arrest
JLB
Bail amount ordered:
2000.00
JLB
J/94 Warrant recalled on 12/28/94 because Booked
LJB
J/94 942540092 Bail posted
========> check
2000.00 IHR
Posted by: GAYLENE FOWLER
IHR
5 09 3 WEST LONGMORE DR
IHR
SLC
UT
IHR
3/94 ARR
scheduled for 12/30/94 at 9:16 A in room 1 with EAW , SWU
Mis Arraignment
JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON
SMT
TAPE: 12546
COUNT:
3486
SMT
ATD: None Present
PRO: None Present
SMT
Deft is not present
SMT
PTC
scheduled for 01/26/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT
Chrg: 76-10-1801
Plea: Not Guilty
SMT
Chrg: 76-10-1801
Plea; Not Guilty
SMT
SMT
Chrg: 76-10-1801
Plea: Not Guilty
SMT
Chrg: 76-10-1801
Plea: Not Guilty
SMT
DON BYBEE WAS PRESENT FOR DEF AN ENTERED NG PLEA.
SMT
CASH BAIL WILL REMAIN AT $2 000 CASH.
LJB
FILED RECEIPT OF CASH BAIL PAID $2000
RECEIPT
04727
SMT
THE DEF CAME TO THE COURT WITH HIS ATTY, DON BYBEE, TO REQUEST
SMT
A RETURN OF THE CASH BAIL. THE COURT ORDERED THE BAIL CHANGED
SMT
TO BOND. UPON POSTING OF $2000 BOND, THE CASH BAIL MAY BE
SMT
RETURNED TO THE DEF.
SMT
6/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE) : .... JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON
SMT
TAPE: 12631
COUNT:
682 xliii

X7
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Citation:

Page
2
JUNE 6, 199 6
1:54 PM
WVC Case: 941004929 MC
Agency No.: WVC
City Misdemeanor
THURSDAY

'"95

Deft Present
SMT
ATD: None Present
PRO: CLARK, DAVID
SMT
PTC
scheduled for 02/16/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT
DON BYBEE WAS GRANTED PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW. GILBERT ATHAY
SMT
WILL REPRESENT ATTY. PTC WAS CONTINUED.
SMT
'95 FILED: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - D
MEL
GILBERT ATHAY
MEL
FILED: REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - D GILBERT ATHAY
MEL
/95 FILED -, 1-25-95 NOTICE AND ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL BY ATTY
SDS
DON L. BYBEE.
SDS
/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE):
JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON
SMT
TAPE: 12689
COUNT:
58
SMT
Deft Present
SMT
ATD: ATHAY, D. GILBERT
PRO: CLARK, DAVID
SMT
PTC
scheduled for 03/29/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT
PTC WAS CONTINUED.
SMT
/95 * * * * * * * N O T E : CASH BAIL OF $2000.00 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE***** IHR
/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE):
JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON
SMT
TAPE: 12831
COUNT:
1430
SMT
Deft Present
SMT
ATD: ATHAY, D. GILBERT
PRO: CLARK, DAVID
SMT
TRJ
scheduled for 04/20/95 at 0900 A in room 1 with EAW SMT
PTC WAS HELD. THERE WAS NO RESOLUITON. TRJ WAS SET. REQUESTED SMT
VOIR DIRE AND INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE DUE 4-13-95.
SMT
1/95 FILED: MOTION BY CITY FOR CONTINUANCE. "
SMT
;/95 TRJ
on 4/20/95 was cancelled
SDS
:/95 NOTE: TRJ RESET TO 5-8-95 AT 9 AM - MAILED NOTICE TO
SDS
ATD-D. GILBERT ATHAY AND TO CITY ATTYS OFFICE.
SDS
TRJ
scheduled for 5/ 8/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW
SDS
5/95 Accepted distribution CF $
4.00 from Misc. Payments screen DSW
1/9 5 FILED: MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE - D GILBERT ATHAY
MEL
J/95 NOTE: JUDGE RESET TRJ TO 6-8-95 AT 9 AM, MAILED NEW NOTICE TO
SDS
ATTY ATHAYS OFFICE AND TO CITY ATTYS OFFICE.
SDS
TRJ
rescheduled to 6/ 8/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS
1/95 FILED: MOTION TO WITHDRAW - D GILBERT ATHAY
MEL
2/95 NOTE: JUDGE WATSON HAS ALLOWED ATTY ATHAY TO WITHDRAW AS
SDS
COUNSEL TO DEFENDANT.
'
SDS
5/95 NOTE; CALLED ATTY ATHAY'S OFFICE AND INFORMED SECRETARTY JO
SDS
THAT THE JUDGE WILL NOT CONTINUE TRJ FROM 6-8-9 5 AND WILL NOT
SDS
SIGN THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW FROM ATTY ATHAY UNTIL ANOTHER
SDS
ATTY IS PREPARED TO GO FORTH WITH THE JURY ON 6-8-95.
SDS
7/95 NOTE: ON 6-7-95 - JUDGE WATSON SIGNED THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW
SDS
ON ATTY ATHAY - AND CONTINUED THE TRJ TO 7-12-95 - TALKED WITH SDS
ATTY MADDOX AND HE STATED THAT 7-12-95 WOULD BE FINE WITH HIM.
SDS
ATTY MADDOX HAS A PREVIOUS COMMITMENT ON 7-10-95.
SDS
TRJ
rescheduled to 7/12/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW SDS
2/95 *******NOTE, DEF HAS CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS ***** IHR
.5/95 FILED: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL - DAVID MADDOX
MEL
6/9 5 FILED: REQUEST FOR FILL OF PARTICULARS - DAVID MADDOX
MEL
)7/95 FILED: REQUEST FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS - DAVID MADDOX
MEL
-0/9 5 TRJ
on 7/12/95 was canceWed
SMT
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Citation:

Page
3
JUNE 6, 199 6
1:54 PM
WV.C Case: 941004929 MC
Agency No.: WVC
City Misdemeanor
THURSDAY

)5 TRIAL WAS CONTINUED AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEF ATTY.
FILED: FAX FROM ATTY MADDOX REQUESTING A CONTINUANCE.
55 FILED: MOTION TO DISMISS OR CONTINUE - DAVID MADDOX
35 FILED: LETTER FROM DEF'S ATTY, DAVID MADDOX
95 TRJ
scheduled for 9/14/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW
95 *****NOTE: CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE*********
95 NOTE: TRJ CONT TO 10-26-95 AT 9 AM, MAILED NEW NOTICE TO
ATTY MADDOX AND TO CITY ATTYS OFFICE.
TRJ
rescheduled to 10/26/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW
95 FILED: AMENDED INFORMATION
95 FILED REQUEST OR ORAL ARGUMENTS & EXPEDITED HEARING
FILED MOTION TO QUASH AMENDED INFORMATION AND STRIKE THE
INFORMATION ON FILE
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED
INFORMATION
FILED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE AMENDED
INFORMATION
95 NOTE; JUDGE SPOKE WITH ATTY MADDOX AS WELL AS ATTY STONEY
JURY TRL WILL BE SET ASIDE, AND WE WILL HAVE THE ORAL ARGUMENTS
AND MO HRGS IN ITS PLACE. LET ATTY STONEY KNOW AS WELL AS
ATTY MADDOX.
TRJ
on 10/26/95 was cancelled
HRG
scheduled for 10/26/95 at 9:00 A in room 1 with EAW
'95 Hearing:
JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON
TAPE: 13529
COUNT:
1540
Deft Present
ATD: MADDOX, DAVID
PRO: STONEY, KEITH
1781 - ATTY MADDOX ARGUED HIS MOTION TO QUASH AMENDED INFORMATION AND STRIKE THE INFORMATION ON FILE.
C2 3 00 - ATTY STONEY RESPONDED
C3 371 - COURT FOUND. THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION IS DEFECTIVE...
THE COURT WILL" ALLOW THE ATTORNEYS TIME TO PRESENT MEMORANDA
AS TO WHETHER THE AMENDED INFORMATION IS ACTUALLY A NEW
INFORMATION AND IS THEREFORE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
DEF WILL HAVE 10 DAYS TO PREPARE MEMO. PROSECUTOR WILL HAVE
10 DAYS TO RESPOND. DEF WILL THEN HAVE AN ADDITIONAL 5 DAYS
TO RESPOND.
/95 FILED MEMORANDUM
/95 *****CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE**********
/9 5 NOTE: REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED BY WEST VALLEY CITY.
/95 FILED; NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION - DAVID MADDOX
/95 FILED MOTION TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
/9 6 LETTER MAILED TO BOTH ATTYS MADDOX AND STONEY REQUESTING
INFORMATION REGARDING JURISDICTION OF THIS CASE.
/96 FILED: LETTER FROM DEF'S ATTY, DAVID MADDOX
•/96 NOTE: *****CASH BAIL OF $2000 BEING HELD ON THIS CASE********
796 HRG
scheduled for 2/ 5/96 at 10:30 A in room 1 with EAW
796 FILED: REPLY TO JUDGES REQUEST FOR RESPONSE REGARDING
DEGREE OF OFFENSE NOTE: WAS BROUGHT OVER FROM CITY ON 2/2/96
Hearing:
JUDGE: EDWARD A. WATSON

V

SMT
SMT
MEL
IHR
SMT
IHR
SDS
SDS
SDS
DOA
LJB
LJB
LJB
LJB
LJB
LJB
LJB
SDS
SDS
SDS
SDS
SDS
SDS
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
SMT
LJB
IHR
SDS
CCE
LJB
SMT
SMT
IHR
IHR
SMT
DOA
DOA
SMT
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WVC Case: 941004929 MC
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City Misdemeanor
THUkoLAY

Citation

NORRIS, RICHARD F

TAPE: 13 8 74
COUNT:
SMT
142
Deft not present
SMT
ATD: MADDOX, DAVID
PRO: STONEY, KEITH
SMT
WEST VALLEY CITY VS RICHARD NORRIS IS BEFORE THE COURT ON A
SMT
MOTION TO STRIKE THE INITIAL INFORMATION AS VOID ON THE BASIS
SMT
IT IS LACKING SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT
SMT
OF PERSONS ALLEGED DEFRAUDED AND THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE
SMT
UTILIZED, PRECLUDING ABILITY TO PREPARE A DEFENSE. THE MOTION
SMT
TO STRIKE WAS FILED SUBSEQUENT TO A DEFENSE REQUEST FOR A BILL
SMT
OF PARTICULARS. THE CITY PROSECUTOR FILED AN AMENDED INFORSMT
MATION. THEREAFTER, THE DEFENSE FILED A MOTION TO QUASH THE
SMT
AMENDED INFORMATION ALLEGING AN INVALID OR VOID INITIAL
SMT
INFORMATION CANNOT BE AMENDED CHARGING CRIMES NOW BARRED BY THE SMT
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. THE COURT RECEIVED
SMT
MEMORANDUMS FROM BOTH PARTIES. IN PROCESS OF REVIEWING THE
SMT
VOLUMINOUS PAPERWORK SUBMITTED BY THE CITY, THE COURT BECAME
SMT
CONCERNED WHETHER IT WAS EXAMINING MATERIAL THAT MAY NEVER
SMT
BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL OF THE CASE AND MAY
SMT
REQUIRE THE COURT TO RECUSE ITSELF FOR EXAMINING SUCH INVESTISMT
GATIVE MATERIAL. AS IT ALWAYS DOES, IN REVIEWING A CASE, THE
SMT
COURT REVIEWED TO CONFIRM JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. THE
SMT
STATUTE 76-10-1801,U.C.A, 1953, AS AMENDED, UNDER WHICH THE
SMT
OFFENSES ARE CHARGED, INDICATES IN SUBPARAGRAPH TWO (2)
SMT
THEREOF, "THE DETERMINATION OF THE DEGREE OF ANY OFFENSE
SMT
UNDER SUBSECTION (1) SHALL BE MEASURED BY THE TOTAL VALUE
SMT
OF ALL PROPERTY, MONEY, OR THINGS OBTAINED OR SOUGHT TO BE
SMT
OBTAINED BY THE SCHEME OR ARTIFICE DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION
SMT
(1.) . . ' .'* THE INITIAL INFORMATION IS SILENT AS TO THE NUMBER SMT
OF VICTIMS AND MEASURE OF VALUE. THE AMENDED INFORAMTION NAMES SMT
FOUR VICTIMS IN FOUR COUNTS AND MEASURES VALUE OF MORE THAN
SMT
$3 00 IN EACH COUNT. ON JANUARY 4, 1996, THE COURT SENT A
SMT
LETTER TO BOTH PARTIES, MR DAVID MADDOX FOR THE DEFENSE AND
SMT
MR KEITH STONEY FOR THE PROSECUTION, REQUESTING INPUT IF THEY
SMT
DESIRED, ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION. RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED
SMT
FROM THE DEFENSE. NONE WAS RECEIVED FROM THE CITY FOR THE
SMT
COURT'S REVIEW PRIOR TO MAKING ITS DECISION THIS 5TH DAY OF
SMT
FEBRUARY 1996. IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF
SMT
JURISDICTION, THE COURT REVIEWED SOME OF THE INVESTIGATIVE
SMT
MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY THE CITY AND DETERMINED THE $1000
SMT
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT FOR CIRCUIT COURT JURISDICTION HAD BEEN
SMT
EXCEEDED. FOR EXAMPLE, A LETTER OF DEMAND FROM DEFENDANT
SMT
NORRIS TO A SINGLE VICTIM OF FOUR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
SMT
DEMANDS $1,600. THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THE CIRCUIT
SMT
COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OF THE FELONIOUS ACTIONS ALLEGED
SMT
IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION. AS A RESULT, THE COURT DOES NOT
SMT
REACH THE ISSUE OF STRIKING THE INITIAL INFORMATION FOR
SMT
VOIDNESS OR THE ISSUE TO QUASH THE AMENDED INFORMATION FOR
SMT
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS'AS RAISED BY THE DEFENSE. SMT
/06/96 C/O THE CASE DISMISSED.
..
SMT
960250227
Refund .of bail.'
.'•*.„• .CHK #: 011474
2000.00 IKR
GAYLENE FOWLER," PAYOR_ OF. Cj^H.BALU. jRECIEVED CASH BAIL REFUND
IHR
05/96

._

^Ivi

..riL.

.-_J5^.-*5&J
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TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE WATSON'S RULING DISMISSING WEST VALLEY
CASE

case.
Now, just

this

morning,

although I have net had a

chance to--to look at it in detail, I received from Mr.
Maddox a fax document that seems to indicate — and I didn't
read it in detail, but just seemed to~-a review, of some
case cited that upholds that finding, that you look to the
total of all of the matters in order to determine
jurisdiction.
MR. STONEY:

Your Honor, I believe that

probably would have been sent in response to my eleventh and
a half hour, as of last Friday that was filed with the
Court THE COURT:

And I don't have yours.

And

for whatever reason, I don't have yours, your Friday thing
in here; but — but anyway, the court finds, without reaching
the issue to strike the initial Information, although I had
pretty much done that in my previous ruling, since it
appeared to me to be one that the Court could not go forward
on; but rather than quash the second one and thus, I do not
have to reach the decision of whether or not the statute of
limitations has run and if this is felony, of course, it has
not run, it could still then be filed with the District
Court without meeting that issue; but ultimately this Court
finds that it is without jurisdiction because of the
amounts.
5
ALAN P. SM£jH::CSR
385 BRAHMA ORlVsNeCTH 2S6-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

0682

MR. MADDOX:

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. 5T0NEY:

Your Honor, can ---,* jet: i

written finding with respect to chat, -.nd I would assume
that even though the Court hasn't had it, since it was filed
last week, the Court will

just include the arguments the

City made; I'm not going to object to the ruling at this
point or anything, but-THE COURT:

well, I haven't received it,

so I don't — but I'm not going to tile a written; that is my
decision.
MR. STONEY:

Well, if the City decides

to appeal, I've got to have something to appeal
THE COURT:
MR. STONEY:

from.

On the docket there.
There's going to have to be

something in writing to indicate w h a t —
THE COURT:

It will be on the docket and

I will sign the docket.
MR. STONEY:
they'll

just send it back to the Court, your H o n o r —
THE COURT:
MR. STONEY:

specific

But what they'll do is

No.
--asking

for a more

finding.
THE COURT:

specific, I do not have
r q
trie amounts

nr

No.

My finding i: very

jurisdiet ion of this case because or

the aggregate of the four victims allegec

ALAN PxkiiiH. CSR
385 BRAHMA DPiVE ;8Cm 2G6-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

S«fPR)0683

!iere, ihat will be in the docket: and I will .;ign -hat docket
and that becomes an appealable order.
3

MR. MADDOX:

Thank you, .: r.\iz

4

MR. STONEY:

Thank you, your Honor.

5

(Whereupon, this hearing was

Honor.

concluded.)

6
7
8

* * *

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
1G
17
13
19
20
21
22
23
24

ALAN PxJ^ITH. CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

^^^00684

JUDGE PALMER'S RULING DISMISSING CASE NUMBER 961020866, AS
QUOTED AND SUMMARIZED IN TWO PLEADINGS FILED BY PROSECUTION

Moreover, Defendant was aware of the fact that his case was active on appeal and that the
District Attorney intended to refile the felony charges once the misdemeanor charges were
resolved. Defendant was not only aware that his case was still pending but actually argued at the
preliminary hearing on felony charges before Judge Palmer on December 10, 1996 that he should
not be required to proceed until the misdemeanor charges were disposed of on appeal. Judge
Palmer agreed and stated, " I'm not willing to hear the felony preliminary hearing until the matter
in West Valley has been completely disposed of by dismissal or otherwise." See, Prelim. Hearing
Trans, p.7, 12/10/96. Thus, Defendant should not have been allowed to file for expungement of
all records of his arrest, investigation, and detention for a case which is still pending on appeal.
Defendant does not meet the requirements listed in § 77-18-10 (l)(c)(i-v) and § 77-18-12 (l)(g).
Additionally, Defendant failed to comply with another provision of § 77-18-10 which
states:
(4) The petitioner shall file a certificate of eligibility issued by the division to be
reviewed by the prosecuting attorney and the court prior to issuing an order
granting the expungement.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-10 (4) (1997). The District Attorney's Office never received a
certificate of eligibility for expungement from the Defendant to review prior to Judge Hilder's
decision to grant the expungement. If such a certificate had been received, the District Attorney's
Office definitely would have objected to the expungement petition.
The State is unable to comment upon why Judge Hilder issued the expungement order
when the State was never informed of the petition nor given an opportunity to object in writing or
at a hearing. Nevertheless, based on the clear language of the statute and the facts of the case, the
order granting expungement of Defendant's records was improper. Therefore, this court should
not enforce the expungement order against the State. A Defendant should not be allowed to use
the expungement statute as a vehicle to block the filing of felony charges. Rather, once the
Defendant's appeal on the misdemeanor charges is resolved, the State should be allowed to use all
li
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5.

The

December

felony

charges

10, 1996.

were

The

set

defendant

for

preliminary

moved

to

quash

hearing
the

on

felony

charges because the West Valley appeal was still pending and had
not yet been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.

Judge Palmer

granted the motion but advised the State that the felony charges
could
6.

be refiled

once the appeal was dismissed..

On March 1, 1997, the District Attorney was advised that the

West Valley appeal had been dismissed.

A copy of the order of

dismissal was mailed to the District Attorney's Office from the
Utah Court of Appeals.

Based on the dismissal of the appeal, the

District Attorney refiled felony charges on March 2, 1997.
7.

On April 11, 1997, the defendant moved to dismiss the felony

charges because the remittitur had not been issued by the Court
of Appeals.
advised

Judge

the

Dever

State

that

granted
charges

the
could

defendant's
be

motion

but

once

the

refiled

remittitur arrived.
8.

On

May

received

9,

1997,

the

the remittitur

Salt

Lake

County

District

from the Court of Appeals

Attorney

and refiled

felony charges on May 15, 1997.
9.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges.

Judge

stayed

the

Robin

Reese

proceedings

denied

the

motion

so the defendant

to

dismiss

but

could appeal the ruling

Court of Appeals to the Utah Supreme Court.
Court

denied

the

defendant's

appeal

and

appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

from the

The Utah Supreme

the

defendant

then

The United States

lit
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JUDGE HILDER'S EXPUNGEMENT ORDER

Third Circuit Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

Petitioner
frame:

£>-/>

Date of Birth:

Address:
Phone:

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE AND
ORDER OF EXPUNGEMENT
AND SEALING

-55

? 3 9 2. Ut/
M ^ 7 ~

3>S,?D
5
i/..4LL£Y

Case No. 9& /JlL J90>

(sTys*///*r

C

<?&/~7<S//
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-18-2, the Coi/rt, afterhearing. hereby makes the following findings
and certifies as follows:
1. That Petitioner was arrested/detained on A ? " 5
' 6
(date) by ^ ^ 5 " 7 ~ " ^ *-*-& ^/•
Haw enforcement agency) and/or charges were filed in this court on / 0 " / ~ *56>
<date) under
Case No. <?£ /0*5o%G><Z
;
2. That petitioner has petitioned the court for an order of expungement and sealing; and
3. That petitioner has complied with all statutory requirements for expungement in this case.
Accordingly^ is HEREBY ORDERED:
1. ThaVCgll recordpin petitioners case in the custody of this court, any other court, or any state, county or
loca entity. agency"ofoflicial shall be EXPUNGED AND SEALED pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-182:
2. That petitioner shall distribute this order to all affected agencies and officials including this Court, the
arresting agency, the booking agency, the Department of Corrections, the Board of Pardons, the prosecutor's
office and the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification.
3. That the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification shall forward a copy of this expungement order to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation if informatipa^regarding this offense was previously provided to that agency.
DATED this

J>/<£ day of

OF U T A H ^ J J ^ ' - : ^ :

i hereby
Ifull
such

35

Deputy

liii
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JUDGE DEVER'S RULING DISMISSING CASE NUMBER 971005698 ON APRIL 11,
1997

1

episode or not, that issue is before the Supreme Court—I

2

mean, before the Court of Appeals.

3

Whether the defendant is using this as a ploy to

4

delay his trial and allow him to continue doing whatever he

5

wants to do is not an issue that makes a difference to this

6

Court.

7

The issue for this Court to decide is whether or not

8

the Rules of Procedures and the Rules of Appellate Procedure

9

limit what this Court is doing in this case.

And I believe,

10

from my reading of the rules, that this matter is presently

11

pending in the Court of Appeals and until the Court of Appeals

12

issues its remittitur, that this Court is prohibited from

13

proceeding.

14

Based upon that, I will grant the motion in this

15

matter to dismiss without prejudice.

16

Salt L a k e — I mean the State of Utah could then determine after

17

the final issue is resolved whether or not you should go

18

forward in West Valley or go forward by the State of Utah.

19
20

MR. JONES:

This—West Valley and

Just—just so I understand.

Once we get

the remittitur, we may re-file, is t h a t —

21

THE COURT:

You may re-file—

22

MR. JONES:

Thank you very much.

23

THE COURT:

— o n c e the remittitur i s —

24

MR. PETERSON:

25

MR. JONES:

Thank you very much, your Honor.

Thank you, Judge.

27
liv

JUDGE REESE'S ORDER OF MAY 22, 1997 DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
CASE NUMBER 971008355

MR. UPDEGROVE:
MR. PETERSON:

June 12th, did you say, Mike?
I didn't. What do the dockets show,

Marlene?
MR. MADDOX:

Can I be excused, your Honor?

THE CLERK:

June 12th at 1:30.

THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

Well, just a second.

June 12, 1:30 p.m.

Here—here's what I'll do, to make it

clear so that Judge Dever's not confused, and we have this in
a little bit of context, I'm going to deny the defendant's
motion to dismiss today.
But I am going to grant a motion to recall the
warrant, or at least, if no one has made the motion, I'll make
my own motion, make it sua sponte, to recall the bench
warrant—or the warrant of arrest, rather, pending the
decision of Judge Dever on the—the dismissal of the earlier
case, whether it is a dismissal with prejudice or a dismissal
without prejudice.
This case will be assigned to Judge Dever. We'll
calendar it for that very date that he hears that case. And
then he will decide, after having heard the motion to dismiss
on the other matter, whether or not this case can remain
pending.

And—because the case would be his, in any event.
I'd ask the State to prepare an order to that effect

that would accompany the file so that when Judge Dever sees

32
Iv

it, it's—it's clear to him what had happened.

When you

prepare that order, submit it to Mr. Maddox for approval as to
form.
If we don't hear back any objection within ten days,
I'll sign it.

If there's an objection, then we'll—we'll go

from there.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
MR. MADDOX:

All right, sir.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *

lvi

33

JUDGE DEVER'S RULING OF NOVEMBER 19, 1997 THAT HE WOULD NOT
RULE ON MOTION TO DISMISS UNTIL THE REMITTITUR ISSUES

to allow the 8355 filing to stand.
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, do you want to respond to
that?
MR. JONES:
think you can.

Well, yeah, I just—I don't—I don't

There's no question you dismissed the one case

in April while we were waiting for the remittitur.

Then we

got word from the Court of Appeals that they were dismissing
the appeal, so we went ahead and re-filed.

That's the case

that's still pending.
And what you said at that time is, it's okay to refile, but I'm going to hold the warrant until we get a
decision from the Court of Appeals, so that's essentially
where we are.

And i f —

THE COURT:

And that's the position the Court is

going to take in this matter.
MR. JONES: Okay.
THE COURT:

I'm not going to dismiss any more cases,

I'm not going to entertain any arguments on any cases until we
have the resolution on the appeals resolved; so, I don't want
to have cases set in front of me again and arguments, because
I'm not going to hear them until I have a remittitur back from
the Court of Appeals.
MR. JONES:

Thanks, Judge.

MR. PETERSON:
THE COURT:

That's all I have, your Honor.

Thank you.
4
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JUDGE DEVER'S RULING OF DECEMBER 4, 1998 DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE, FINDING COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE
CONSTITUTIONAL

1

reality we've got instructions from two different judges telling

2

us when and under what conditions or circumstances we can go

3

ahead and refile.

4

JUDGE:

5

prejudice in the case number 5698. That,case has been dismissed.

6

The case number 971008355 I'll deny your motion to dismiss in

7

that matter as well.

8

ATD:

9

to dismissal without prejudice. And, by the way, may I approach,

Very well. I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss with

Well, Judge, there are separate issues in 8355 relative

10

Judge?

I do have.. When you handed me back my expungement memo

11

you also handed me the initial memo in that file. Your Honor, one

12

point of clarification; I take it you're ruling that the statute

13

is not unconstitutional.

14

JUDGE:

Oh, on the vague., vagueness matter?

15

ATD:

Right.

16

JUDGE:

Yes.

17

ATD:

Okay. Judge, did you want to entertain any argument at

18

all on that issue. Do you think..

19

JUDGE:

20

in your memorandums, and I've read through that, and I believe

21

State's position is correct.

22

ATD:

23

appeal, that the State's example at the end of their memorandum

24

on pages three and four is an example that clearly displays why

25

the statute's unconstitutional. Mr. Jones cites a case where if

26

you have communications with ten people and in each of those

No. I believed that it's outlined clearly by both sides

Okay. I, I would point out then, again for purposes of
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1

communications you obtain a hundred dollars each, then you have

2

ten separate acts of communications fraud..

3

JUDGE:

Urn-hum.

4

ATD:

But, you also have a felony.

5

JUDGE:

Urn-hum.

6

ATD:

Because first you count them ten times and then you

7

aggregate it. Well, you can't have it both ways, Judge. The

8

statute either has to allow an aggregation, a sum of a thousand

9

dollars, in order to get you a felony level scheme, or it has to

10

break it down as ten separate misdemeanor offenses at a hundred

11

dollars each. And the very.. The very example that Mr. Jones

12

articulates is the one that points most clearly to why the

13

statute is facially unconstitutional. And procedurally, Judge,

14

let's be clear where this case came from.

15

prosecutor in West Valley City that brought the action, and he

16

said to Judge Watson, Judge I get to file ten separate

17

misdemeanors if they're each a hundred dollar communications. And

18

Judge Watson said no you have to aggregate it as one felony. Mr.

19

Stoney filed an appeal saying no, no, no, each separate

20

communication...

21

JUDGE:

22

dismissed.

23

ATD:

24

separate communication is a separate misdemeanor.

25

strongly the State felt in Judge Watson's court.

26

JUDGE:

Keith Stoney was the

Well, that has never been addressed. That appeal was

I understand. I'm telling you what he briefed.

Every

That's how

Well, that's Mr. Stoney.

A9
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ATD:

I understand, but the point is Judge Watson, in that

case, in a case that's sort of coequal law of the case, ruled no,
it's one or the other. Either you aggregate it as a single felony
offense or you have ten separate misdemeanors at a hundred
dollars each.
JUDGE:

Urn-hum.

ATD:

And he dismissed the case and said go refile as one

felony. Well, Mr. Jone's example is you either have the ten
misdemeanors at a hundred or you have one felony at a thousand,
but you don't have ten separate felonies because somehov/ the ten
communications a dded up to one thousand. That's his argument
here.
JUDGE:

Well, the statute says each separate communication is a

separate act or offense.
ATD:

It does.

JUDGE:

And that's quoting from your memorandum.

ATD:

Well that's what the statute says.

JUDGE:

And the other part of statute says that the

determination of the degree of any offense shall be measured by
the total value of things to be obtained by the scheme. And the
scheme is all of these separate communications.
ATD:

Right.

JUDGE:

That's the interpretation.

ATD:

Right.

JUDGE:

And therefore, if the total amount is a felony then

each one of these separate communications is also a felony.
20
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1

ATD:

And you're saying that's constitutional on it's face?

2

JUDGE:

Right.

3

ATD:

I see.

4

JUDGE:

Anything further?

5

ATP:

I think the next thing is we need to set a Prelim, if

6

we can, and..

7

ATD:

8

and without prejudice. I know you've ruled that with prejudice

9

won't be granted because the expungement doesn't bar refiling,

Well, Judge we do have the dismissal on case 8355 with

10

the statute is constitutional and the vindictiveness hasn't been

11

shown, but in 8355 we have the same basis for a dismissal in the

12

case that we had in 5698, that is, an appeal was pending. It's

13

simply that in 835..

14

JUDGE:

An appeal is not pending anymore in this case.

15

ATD:

It's not anymore, and so it can be filed now.

16

JUDGE:

It's already been filed...

17

ATD:

But an appeal was pending when the case was first

18

filed.

19

JUDGE:

Okay?

20

ATD:

It was..

21

JUDGE:

Filed effective this date; is that what you're saying?

22

ATD:

Well, if that's what you'd like to rule. But the appeal

23

was pending when 6355 was filed.

24

JUDGE:

And, so, what are you saying?

25

ATD:

Well, I'm saying that 8355, it wasn't properly

26

because the appeal was still underway at the time. And the appeal

filed

lxi

0077B

1

process has run it's course, the matter can be filed, but it

2

couldn't on the date 8355 was actually filed.

3

JUDGE:

Well it's properly before me now, is it not?

4

ATD:

If the State files it as of today.

5

ATP:

We filed it back in May 22nd of 90--, 1997 I believe.

6

At least that's the latest one. And what happened was we filed it

7

and the court said you can file the information but we'll take it

8

under advisement for the time being until the appeals are

9

resolved.

10

JUDGE:

Well, it gets filed when it's filed. Appeals have been

Ll

resolved. I believe it's properly before the court.

L2

ATD:

L3

the court? Because when it was filed the appeals were still

L4

pending in the West Valley case. And you dismissed 5698 for that

L5

singular reason. You said don't be filing anything until the

L6

appeals are done. 8355 was filed before the appeals were done.

L7

ATP:

L8

couldn't file until the remittitur came back. Once we got the

19

remittitur back, that's when we filed this latest case. In May of

20

97. My recollection is as soon

21

around and petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court.

22

JUDGE:

23

can't file the information. I think that if there's an issue

24

concerning whether or not it's properly before the court as an

25

appeal and any hearing on that can be stayed. And I think that's

26

what I said, that I'm not going to dismiss this and entertain no

Judge, as of what effective date is it properly before

Well, let's be clear. Judge, what you said was that we

as we filed then Mr. Norris turned

Well I don't think there's anything that says that they

22

lxii

00777

1

further motions until the remittitur is received.

2

ATP:

Right.

3 '

JUDGE:

The remittitur's been received so I think it's properly

4

before the court. I don't have anything that says they can't file

5

it, and therefore it's properly before the court.

6

ATD:

7

issued your order dismissing the case was the concept that you

8

can't file one set of charges when that same set of charges is

9

pending in a duplicate file on appeal. And so you didn't: have

Well, Judge, what we agreed on the first time you

10

hesitation dismissing 5698 on that basis. On essentially a double

11 ,

jeopardy analysis basis.

12

There was a remittitur from our State's Supreme Court, a

13

subsequent appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court in West Valley

14

versus Norris, and the case was still on active appeal until the

15

United States Supreme Court issue it's denial and remittitur.

16

Once that occurs, then clearly West Valley versus Norris is over

17

and 8355 can be filed. But the law we cited in our initial motion

18

to dismiss, which you granted, is that you cannot have duplicate

19

filings with the same charges when the first case is on appeal.

20

(pause)

21

JUDGE:

22

Anything?

23

ATP:

24

factual scenario that took place here, and what I have down on

25

our second page, number seven, paragraph number seven is on April

26

11th of 1937 you dismissed the felony charges because of the

And the same thing applies in 83 55.

Mr. Jones, what do you want to say about this?

Well, Judge, in our memorandum we've outline the

23
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1

remittitur h a d not b e e n issued by the court of a p p e a l . You

2

advised the p a r t i e s the c h a r g e s could be filed o n c e the

3

remittitur a r r i v e d from the Court of A p p e a l s . A m o n t h later, in

4

May of 9 7 , the district A t t o r n e y ' s O f f i c e r e c e i v e d the remittitur

5

from the Court of A p p e a l s and filed felony c h a r g e s . T h o s e charges

6

are c u r r e n t l y p e n d i n g , but Y o u r Honor h a d r e c a l l e d the arrest

7

warrant u n t i l a m o t i o n to d i s m i s s could be r e s o l v e d . The

8

defendant filed a m o t i o n to dismiss the case w i t h p r e j u d i c e .

9

That's the one we just argued. So it just s e e m s to me that, that

10

there was no q u e s t i o n we can file the c h a r g e s , w e ' v e d o n e that.

11

The r e m i t t i t u r came b a c k . What stopped us a f t e r that p o i n t in

12

time, in M a y of 97, is he then petitioned the U . S . S u p r e m e Court

13

so it put us b a c k on hold. Cause even t h o u g h the r e m i t t i t u r had

14

been issued they r e c a l l e d the remittitur later o n b e c a u s e this

15

case had gone up on a p p e a l to the U.S. S u p r e m e C o u r t .

16

JUDGE:

17

(inaudible) and before M a y 15th. If you filed o n M a y 1 5 t h then

13

that's the d a t e .

19

ATP:

20

15.

21

JUDGE:

22

this time?

23

ATP:

T h a t ' d be fine.

24

JUDGE:

How m u c h time d o we need to do this?

25

ATP:

J u d g e , I think we probably ought to h a v e a s p e c i a l

26

setting if we c a n . We p r o b a b l y got anywhere b e t w e e n e i g h t and ten

O k a y . The r e m i t t i t u r was issued and y o u

filed

R i g h t . T h a t ' s the date the w a r r a n t w a s s i g n e d w a s M a y

Y o u want to set this matter for P r e l i m i n a r y H e a r i n g at

24
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JUDGE PALMER'S RULINGS OF APRIL 2, 1999, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS GROUNDS AND BINDING OVER ON TWELVE
COUNTS

It could have been called to his attention.
It's up to this Court to determine the—the date of
filing and I would find that the filing date in this case is
May 15th of 1997, after the case in West Valley had been
dismissed.

The—the proceedings were then stayed by Judge

Reese, pending the results of the defendant's appeal and as I
understand the law, when an appeal is made, then the—the
statute of limitations are tolled.

That just makes sense and-

-and comports with the inner suggestus, simply because the
defendant cannot profit by his own delays in the case.
So, I specifically find that he is not put in
jeopardy twice, because the West Valley case had—had already
been dismissed.
The final re-filed Information, as of May 15th,
1997, alleges offenses occurring during a time period ending
June of 1993, which is within the four-year limitation period.
The defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of expiration
of the statute of limitations is therefore denied.
We'll now proceed to hear arguments as to the merits
of the case, if you wish to do that.
Who wants to go first?

Mr. Jones, do you want two

chances or do you just want to respond to Mr. Peterson?
MR. JONES:

I'm willing to just respond, Judge.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Peterson, each side just gets

one chance then.

Ixv22

1

All right.

The purpose of the Court today is to

2

find whether or not there's probable cause to determine if the

3

twelve counts as alleged, and remaining, have been committed

4

and that the defendant committed them and if there's

5

sufficient evidence to bind the evidence over for a finder of

6

fact.

7

And I'm doing this with the most recent Supreme

8

Court cases in mind.

9

limited somewhat in—in what evidential—evidentiary findings

10

As you know, a hearing magistrate is now

a magistrate can make.

11

In this case, the defendant is charged in twelve

12

counts of devising a scheme or artifice—artifice to defraud

13

another.

14

thread here, all answered an ad promising or representing that

15

they'd be making up to or at least fourteen hundred a month

16

plus benefits.

17

All the—the witnesses testified as to a common

All answered that same ad.

When they met with Mr. Norris, he offered them the .

18

job and put two papers in front of them, which they were not

19

allowed to take home and read, before they signed.

That he

20

told them it was necessary to sign it immediately.

All of

21

them, virtually, testified that they didn't have time to read

22

it, but based on his representations, they went ahead and

23

signed these papers, which, contrary to their belief that they

24

would be an employee entitled to salary and benefits, told

25

that they would be independent contractors.
35
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One witness, that is Joy Slotsve, did testify that
she did understand that she was an independent contractor, but
the defendant made further misrepresentations to her status as
a medical consultant.
The Court finds there is evidence from which a
finder of fact could find that the defendant made at least two
communications with these people.

And according to the

Court's notes, all of these people met with the defendant in
the latter part of May of 1993, except Kay Utley Lemmon, who
indicated as to a date, only that she answered an ad in the
paper in April of 1993, and subsequently met with the
defendant.
So, the Court would find that there is sufficient
evidence that these offenses all happened with the statutory
period.
As further evidence of the defendant's intent on
this matter, to—to misrepresent the situation and make
fraudulent representations are the—the testimony of Karen
Noland, that she worked for the defendant in 1995 and 1996,
and he told her that there was no way any of these people
would be paid because no one could meet the quota and the
defendant would earn his money by suing the sales people. He
called her to destroy records.

He left town for about two

weeks when his arrest was imminent and also had her prepare
false evidence.

36
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1 I

Based on the evidence, the Court finds probable

2 I cause to believe that the offenses as alleged in the remaining
3

twelve counts have been committed and that the defendant

4

committed them.

5

on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 19 and 20.

6
7

He is therefore ordered bound over for trial

MR. PETERSON:

Your Honor, relative to the level of

offense in each of those eight counts—

8

THE COURT:

Bound over as felonies.

9

MR. PETERSON:

Okay.

Did the Court want to recount

10

specifically the basis for the ruling on some of the value

11

or—

12

THE COURT:

The ruling is that the State has made an

13

allegation that the fourteen hundred dollars which was offered

14

each victim as salary meets the threshold for a felony count

15

and they are entitled to prove that before the finder of fact,

16

or attempt to prove it.

17

Okay.

Anything else?

18

MR. PETERSON:

19

THE CLERK:

April 16th, at 10:30 before Judge Noel.

20

THE COURT:

And the defendant is released a s —

21

MR. JONES:

Judge, I—-

22

THE COURT:

—presently released.

23

MR. JONES:

— I would like the Court to consider one

Let's see, a date, your Honor?

24

other matter.

Mr. Norris had asked that the Court appoint a

25

public defender to represent him, claiming that he was

37
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JUDGE PALMER'S WRITTEN RULING ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

FILEB DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ERNEST W. JONES, 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

JUN 0 8 1899
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By

1 P

i

AJOAA^J^r
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER REGARDING STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 971008355FS
RICHARD NORRIS,
Hon. Phillip K. Palmer
Defendant.
The defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the Statute of Limitations came on for
hearing on April 2, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer. The State was
represented by Ernest W. Jones, Deputy District Attorney.

The defendant was present and

represented by Michael R. Peterson, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. The Court having
considered the memorandum of law and the oral arguments of counsel enters the following
Findings of Fact:
1.

The defendant was originally charged on October 1, 1996 in Third District Court

with felony counts of Communication Fraud pursuant to Section 76-10=1801, U.C.A. by the Salt
Lake County District Attorney.
2.

Those charges were quashed on December 10, 1996 by Judge Phillip Palmer

because the West Valley misdemeanor case involving the same charges was still on appeal.
3.

The felony charges were refiled on March 2, 1997.

Judge Lee A. Dever

dismissed these charges on April 11, 1997 because the remittitur had not arrived from the Utah
Court of Appeals.
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ORDER REGARDING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Case No. 971008355FS
Page 2

4.

Felony charges were refiled on May 15, 1997 once the remittitur arrived at Third

District Court. Judge Robin Reese stayed those charges while the defendant appealed the West
Valley case to the Utah Supreme Court.
5.

The defendant appealed the matter to the Utah Supreme Court and the United

States Supreme Court.
6.

A remittitur was issued on October 30, 1998 from the United States Supreme

Court denying the defendant's appeal and remanding the case.
The Court enters the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

The defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the Statute of Limitations is denied.

2.

The filing date is May 15, 1997 for the felony charges.

3.

The filing date is not October 30, 1998.

Judge Dever never signed the

defendant's proposed order requesting that filing date be October 30, 1998.
4.

The motion to quash and the appeals filed by the defendant toll the running of the

Statute of Limitations in this felony case.
5.

The defendant never suffered double jeopardy because he was never tried for the

West Valley misdemeanor case.

Michael R Peterson
Counsel for Defendant
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ORDER REGARDING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Regarding Statute Of
Limitations was delivered to Michael R. Peterson, Attorney for Defendant RICHARD NORRIS,
at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 7 ^ - d a y of April, 1999.

-/hufttllp. wntMhs
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JUDGE REESE'S RULINGS ON OCTOBER 21, 1999, DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND THAT EXPUNGEMENT ORDER DID NOT BAR USE OF
EXPUNGED POLICE REPORT

said, well, we want you to grant it with prejudice.

The

remittitur w a s — w a s still pending at that time, and I think
I—
MR. NORRIS:

It was recalled.

It was recalled

because we initiated (inaudible) by the Utah Supreme Court.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

That's what I was about to say.

It looks like the action in t h i s — i n this case, t h e — t h e one
the State characterizes as the second filing, case ending-MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:

Right.
— 5 6 9 8 , was an effort by the defense to

have the dismissals be with p r e j u d i c e —
MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:
MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:

Correct.
— a s opposed to without.
Correct.
All right.

It would appear to me that

the second case, the 5 — t h e one ending 5698, was dismissed, in
fact, o n — i n April of 1997, and that the one that the State
characterizes as the third case, which is the one at hand
here, 8355, was filed in May of 1997.
I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss, Mr. Norris.
It would seem to me that the State filed this lawsuit in May
of 1997.

There's no reason t o — t o assume a different filing

date than the actual filing date.

Even though you were

attempting to stop West Valley f r o m — f r o m dismissing their own
appeal o f — o f an earlier dismissal, I don't know that your
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1

effort to keep those West Valley misdemeanors alive, which is

2

in fact what it was, would prohibit the State from filing the

3

felonies, when the prosecutor in those misdemeanor cases

4

wanted them dismissed.

5

I—I can't see any good legal reason to—to permit

6

that result, or any good policy reason to permit that result.

7

West Valley may have made a mistake initially in filing the

8

appeal, but after they chose to withdraw that appeal, then it

9

seems to me the State's permitted to file its new felony cases

10

and the mere fact that you've kind of kept that ball in the

11

air, as I analogized earlier, would not prohibit them from

12

filing the lawsuit.

13

So, I'll deem the filing to be as of May of 1997,

14

well within the period of the statute of limitations and deny

15

your motion to dismiss.

16
17
18
19
20

MR. SKORDAS:

Your Honor, Mr. Norris has asked me to

ask the Court if he could address the Court briefly.
THE COURT:

No, sir.

No.

I'll hear from your

attorney on these arguments, sir.
Now, there's a second motion filed by the defendant

21

and that's the motion to—in effect, it looks to me like a

22

motion to—to suppress evidence.

23

I—I think I read it carefully, but it would appear that

24

because the arrest of Mr. Norris was expunged, that the

25

evidence is—of—of the police officers' investigations prior
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And maybe I understand it,

THE COURT:

Okay.

I think I understand.

Did you

have anything else?
MR. JONES:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

T h e — t h e Ambus case is

a—kind—an

appeal from a decision by the Utah State Board of Education to
revoke Mr. Ambus' teaching certificate based on some things
that they had learned about, that occur after Mr. Ambus had
had an expungement of his conviction, if I'm not mistaken.
that what it says?

Is that t h e — i s that that case?

MR. SKORDAS:
THE COURT:

Is

Yes.
A different situation here.

I'm not

prepared to rule today that once an arrest has been expunged
that all police memory as well as the reports and everything
that may have been compiled beforehand are obliterated and the
investigation is required to begin anew.
Ambus says.

That's not what

It's limited to its facts, it would seem to me.

And when the officers presented this case to the
District Attorney in May of 1997, they were p r o — t h e y were not
prohibited from repeating, as a part of the screening process,
information they had learned before the expungement order was
signed.
I don't think that's what the expungement law
anticipates and I don't believe that's what the Ambus case
says.

So, again, I'll deny the motion to suppress the

evidence the police had obtained before the expungement.
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The

1

J State can rely on that evidence at the trial.

2

Now, evidence of Mr. Norris' arrest certainly have

3

been expunged and the State can't use that evidence against

4

him, because it has been expunged; but information obtained

5

from witnesses and compiled before the expungement, the

6

State's not prohibited from using.

That's my ruling today.

7

MR. JONES:

Thank you, your Honor.

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

MR. SKORDAS:

10

I do have one other motion that's

pending.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SKORDAS:

13

Now, M r . —

And what was that one?

I didn't

see—

It's a supplemental request for

discovery.

14

THE COURT:

Oh, yes.

There is that one.

15

All police reports required in connec—acquired in

16

connection with the case.

17

recordings of any witnesses interviewed in connection with the

18

case.

19
20

Let's start with those two.

Do you have any

objections supplying those?

21
22

All v i s u a l — a u d i o and visual

MR. JONES:

I think we've supplied all that, haven't

we?

23

MR. SKORDAS:

And they've already indicated they

24

have no objection to those two.

25

here on.

It's the third one that we're
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STATE V. SMITH, 2003 UT APP 425, 2003 WL 22922435 (UNPUBLISHED
OPINION)

Page 1

Not Reported in P.2d
2003 UT App 425
(Cite as: 2003 WL 22922435 (Utah App.))
unreasonable and unjust." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT
App 134 *2. 17 P.3d 1153 (second alteration in
original) (quotations and citations omitted).

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES
BEFORE CITING.

To obtain a conviction under the communications fraud
statute, the State must prove the following elements:
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another
money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions, and who
communicates directly or indirectly with any person
by any means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
David Benjamin SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20010949-CA.
Dec. 11,2003.

(d) a second degree felony when the value of the
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be
obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed
$100,000;

Fifth District, St. George Department; The Honorable
Anthony W. Schofield.
Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for Appellant.

(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection
(1) means to bestow, convey, make known, recount,
impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or
to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include, but are not
limited to, use of the mail, telephone, telegraph,
radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken
and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section
unless the pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions made or omitted were made or
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-180im(dV ( 6 \ CI). We
review "the evidence and all inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict." State v. Hoteate, 2000 UT 74/jj 18, 10 P.3d
346.

MarkL. Shurtleffand Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City,
and Matthew C. Miller, St. George, for Appellee.

Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and GREENWOOD.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
DAVIS, Judge:
*1 Defendant challenges his conviction for
communications fraud under Utah Code Annotated
section 76-10-1801 (Supp,199Q>
IFN11 (the
communications fraud statute).

Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he devised the fraudulent scheme and
communicated it to the victim. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1801(1), (6). Among other things, Defendant
argues that because the victim learned of the investment
scheme from Lance Hatch and Lee Walker, he did not
devise, nor communicate, the investment scheme to the
victim. However, the jury heard evidence that
Defendant had knowledge of the investment scheme;
was involved in the scheme; directly told the victim that

FNL-

Defendant argues that the evidence introduced at trial
was insufficient to sustain the jury's guilty verdict on
the communications fraud count. "[W]e will reverse a
jury verdict only when ... we find that the evidence to
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
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he was running the investment; told the victim that the
investment was "a sure thing"; instructed Walker to
divert $50,000 of the victim's investment into
Defendant's personal bank account without telling the
victim that he diverted the $50,000 into his personal
bank account; and spoke with the victim five or six
times by telephone concerning payment on the victim's
investment.
*2 Defendant may disagree with the evidence
presented, but "[he] is not entitled to reversal of [his]
conviction simply because [his] version of the facts is
different from the State's [version of the facts]." State v.
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 544 (Utah 1994V "After
reviewing the evidence presented against [Defendant],
we are not convinced that it is so lacking as to ' "make
the Oury'sl verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." ' "
Strinzham, 2001 UT App 13 at If 30 (second alteration
in original) (citations omitted).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Defendant's
conviction.

WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH and PAMELA
T. GREENWOOD, Judges.
2003 WL 22922435 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App 425
END OF DOCUMENT
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